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Oren Perez*
ABSTRACT
The idea of green economy, which was placed on the global
agenda by the Rio+20 conference, claims to serve as a bridge
between the demands of global capitalism and the vision of sus-
tainability. In the corporate social responsibility (CSR) litera-
ture, writers such as Michael Porter and Mark Kramer have
made a similar claim, arguing that there is a positive correla-
tion between corporate social performance and corporate finan-
cial performance. I argue that the claim underlying the green
economy thesis, whereby the goals of (classical) economic growth
and sustainable development can be achieved concurrently, is
highly problematic. First, the claim disregards the extent to
which the web of ideas and institutional structures that under-
pin the global capitalist system constrains the capacity of agents
to commit themselves to sustainable policies. Second, it under-
states the difficult tradeoffs involved in implementing green
growth policies. This critique ties in with the debate over the
capacity of CSR instruments to promote sustainable develop-
ment. I examine this general critique in the context the two lead-
ing global sustainability indexes: the FTSE4Good Index Series
(FTSE4Good) and the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI).
Sustainability indexes epitomize the green economy thesis be-
cause they claim to positively affect the sustainability profile of
firms despite the fact that (or precisely because) they are situat-
ed at the heart of modern capitalism: the stock exchange. I
demonstrate how the paradox at the heart of the green economy
thesis manifests in sustainable indexes. In particular, I high-
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light the tension between the indexes dual role as financial
products (tracking the firms share values) and as CSR instru-
ments. I also show that both indexes suffer from a deep demo-
cratic deficit, which is inconsistent with their public function. I
conclude with policy recommendations that could bring the in-
dexes closer to a more meaningful understanding of the concept
of green economy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Rio+20 conferencewhich took place in Rio de Janei-
ro, Brazil, on June 2022, 2012 to mark the 20th anniversary of
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED)sought to reinvigorate the debate on
sustainable development by introducing a new theme, the idea
of green economy, into the deliberative arena.1 This theme
played a pivotal role in the discussions that took place at the
conference2 and was strongly emphasized in the conferences
concluding document, The Future We Want.3 According to a key
report published by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) a year before the conference, a green economy
is
[O]ne that results in improved human well-being and social equity,
while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scar-
cities. In its simplest expression, a green economy is low-carbon, re-
source efficient, and socially inclusive. In a green economy, growth in
income and employment should be driven by public and private in-
vestments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, enhance ener-
gy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and
ecosystem services.4
As this definition makes clear, the idea of green economy is
closely related to the notion of green growth: the process of
making growth processes resource-efficient, cleaner and more
resilient without necessarily slowing them.5 The idea of green
1. About, U.N. CONF. ON SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
http://www.uncsd2012.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
2. See Green Economy in the Context of Sustainable Development and
Poverty Eradication, U.N. CONF. ON SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
http://www.uncsd2012.org/greeneconomy.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); see
also WORLD DEV. MOVEMENT, RIO+20 SUMMIT: WHOSE GREEN ECONOMY?
(2012), http://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/rio20-
green-economy-briefing.pdf; Oliver Greenfield, Rio+20 Verdict? The Green
Economy is Growing Up, GREEN ECON. COALITION (June 2012),
http://www.greeneconomycoalition.org/updates/rio20-verdict-green-economy-
growing.
3. G.A. Res. 66/288, annex, The Future We Want, ¶¶ 5674 (July 27,
2012) [hereinafter The Future We Want].
4. U.N. Envt Programme [UNEP], Towards a Green Economy: Pathways
to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication, at 16 (2011) (citation
omitted).
5. Stéphane Hallegatte et al., From Growth to Green Growth: A
Framework 2 (The World Bank, Sustainable Dev. Network, Office of the Chief
Economist, Working Paper No. 5872, 2011). For a similar definition of green
growth, see World Bank Group [WBG], Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway
to Sustainable Development, at 2, WBG Doc. 69125 (2012),
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economy operates therefore as a possible bridge between the
demands of global capitalism and the vision of sustainability.
The understanding of green economy as a framework within
which the goals of (classical) economic growth and sustainable
development can be achieved concurrently is further empha-
sized in paragraph 56 of The Future We Want:
[W]e consider green economy in the context of sustainable develop-
ment and poverty eradication as one of the important tools available
for achieving sustainable development and that it could provide op-
tions for policymaking but should not be a rigid set of rules. We em-
phasize that it should contribute to eradicating poverty as well as
sustained economic growth, enhancing social inclusion, improving
human welfare and creating opportunities for employment and de-
cent work for all, while maintaining the healthy functioning of the
Earths ecosystems.6
Similar reference to the bridging role of the concept of
green economy can be found in paragraph 58 of The Future We
Want, which states that the functions of green economy policies
include the promotion of sustained and inclusive economic
growth, the facilitation of sustainable consumption and pro-
duction patterns, and the enhancement of the welfare of mar-
ginalized citizens, taking into account the three dimensions of
sustainable development.7
The attempt of the Rio+20 conference to forge a middle
way between the visions of capitalism and sustainable devel-
opment finds support in the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) literature, which examines the potential synergies be-
tween sustainability and economic growth at the firm level.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16283976/inclusive-green-
growth-pathway-sustainable-development ([G]rowth that is efficient in its
use of natural resources, clean in that it minimizes pollution and environmen-
tal impacts, and resilient in that it accounts for natural hazards and the role
of environmental management and natural capital in preventing physical dis-
asters. And this growth needs to be inclusive.); see also Edward B. Barbier,
The Green Economy Post Rio+20, 338 SCIENCE 887, 887 (2012) (explaning that
the theme of the Rio+20 conference was how economies can accomplish green
growth).
6. The Future We Want, supra note 3, ¶ 56 (emphasis added).
7. Id. ¶ 58 (We affirm that green economy policies in the context of sus-
tainable development and poverty eradication should: . . . [r]espect each coun-
trys national sovereignty over their natural resources, taking into account its
national circumstances . . . with regard to the three dimensions of sustainable
development; . . . [p]romote sustained and inclusive economic
growth; . . . [p]romote sustainable consumption and production pat-
terns; . . . [e]nhance the welfare of indigenous peoples . . . of women, children,
youth, persons with disabilities . . . .).
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One important strand of research within this field examines
the links between corporate social performance (CSP) and cor-
porate financial performance (CFP).8 A recurring theme in this
literature is the argument that there is a positive correlation
between CSP and CFP.9 This argument provides a business
justification for firms to invest in CSR programs,10 in the same
way the green economy thesis claims that sustainability poli-
cies also generate broad economic benefits.11
A particularly prominent figure in this literature is Har-
vard Business School professor Michael Porter, who has pub-
lished a series of articles on the subject in the past twenty
years.12 A good example is the article entitled Creating Shared
Value.13 Porter and his co-author, Mark Kramer, argued that
the notion of shared value can be used to redefine the purpose
of the corporation, moving away from the simplistic notion of
profit maximization.14 According to the authors, the commonly
invoked idea of externalities generates a self-perpetuating wel-
fare-reducing cycle.15 The idea of externalities means, they ar-
gue, is that society, through its regulatory agencies, must im-
pose taxes, regulations, and penalties so that firms internalize
these externalities.16 But this notion has also shaped the
strategies of firms themselves, which have largely excluded so-
cial and environmental considerations from their economic
thinking. Firms have taken the broader context in which they
do business as a given, and resisted regulatory standards [and
8. See Donna J. Wood, Measuring Corporate Social Performance: A
Review, 12 INTL J. MGMT. REVIEWS 50 (2010) (offering an overview of the
literature discussing the correlation between CSP and CFP).
9. Id. at 5962.
10. See id.; U.N. Envt Programme Fin. Initiative [UNEP FI], Integrated
Governance: A New Model of Goverance for Sustainability, at 1314 (2014).
11. See, e.g., U.N. Envt Programme [UNEP], supra note 4, at 12 (explain-
ing that [a] shift to a green economy also means a shift in employment which,
at a minimum, will create as many jobs as business as usual).
12. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value:
How to Reinvent Capitalism and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth,
HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.Feb. 2011, at 62 [hereinafter Porter & Kramer, Creat-
ing Shared Value]; Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Dec. 2006, at 78; Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Green and
Competitive: Ending the Stalemate, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.Oct. 1995, at 120.
13. Porter & Kramer, Creating Shared Value, supra note 12.
14. Id. at 64.
15. Id. at 65.
16. Id.
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implicitly the objectives underlying them] as . . . contrary to
their interests.17 Going beyond these standards has been re-
garded as an irresponsible use of shareholders money.18 Por-
ter argues that each side [state and firms] has assumed that
the other is an obstacle to pursuing its goals and acted accord-
ingly.19
Porter and Kramer offered the concept of shared value as
an alternative to this self-perpetuating, welfare-reducing cy-
cle.20 The idea of shared value reflects an alternative vision of
the firm,21 which constitutes a middle path between the con-
tradictory ideas of the firm as an amoral optimizer or as a com-
pletely benevolent agent. In contrast to the prevailing para-
digm that emphasizes the conflict between the firm and society,
the concept of shared value recognizes that markets are defined
not only by conventional economic needs but by social ones, as
well.22 It also recognizes that social harms . . . frequently cre-
ate internal costs for firmssuch as wasted energy or raw ma-
terials, [and] costly accidents.23 Furthermore, addressing so-
cietal harms and constraints does not necessarily raise costs for
firms, because they can innovate through using new technolo-
gies, operating methods, and management approachesand as
a result, increase their productivity and expand their mar-
kets.24 Thus, shared value is about expanding the total pool of
economic and social value.25
The green economy and shared value theses touch upon
two important debates in the CSR literature. The first debate
concerns the nature of the firmin particular whether the
model of the firm as an amoral optimizer has a sound empirical
and normative basis. A second debate concerns the question of
the efficacy of the various global CSR codes that have emerged
in the past few years. Against the green economy literature
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 66 (explaining that [t]he concept of shared value can be
defined as policies and operating practices that enhance the competiveness of
a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions
in the communities in which it operates).
22. Id. at 65.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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that argues that CSR promotes both sustainability and finan-
cial performance, there is an opposing strand that argues that
the CSR movement and the various codes associated with it are
nothing but a greenwash ploy: a façade of environmental reg-
ulation, whose only objective is to enable corporations to pursue
their ecologically destructive practices.26
The ideas of green economy and shared value are enticing.
By offering a way to bring into harmony the competing ideas of
capitalism and sustainability, they respond to a deep human
propensity for achieving consistency in our inner cognitive and
emotive processes.27 But although these ideas have some foun-
dation in theory, they both suffer from significant shortcomings
and blind spots that undermine their capacity to facilitate pro-
sustainability changes. The bridging thesis that underpins
Rio+20 and Porter and Kramers writings underestimates the
difficulties of adopting truly sustainable policies under the cur-
rent global economic system, whether at the national or at the
firm level. In particular, the win-win approach that underlies
the green economy and shared value theses disregards the ex-
tent to which the web of ideas and institutional structures that
underpin the global capitalist system constrains the capacity of
agentspeople, firms, and other market institutions (such as
sustainability indexes)to commit themselves to sustainable
policies. Furthermore, the win-win thesis conceals the difficult
trade-offs that must be addressed if the global society embarks
on a genuinely sustainable growth path. What makes these
26. For this critique, see, for example, WAYNE VISSER, THE AGE OF
RESPONSIBILITY: CSR 2.0 AND THE NEW DNA OF BUSINESS 9092 (2011); Igor
M. Alves, Green Spin Everywhere: How Greenwashing Reveals the Limits of
the CSR Paradigm, J. GLOBAL CHANGE & GOVERNANCE, Winter/Spring 2009,
at 2; Ralph Hamann & Paul Kapelus, Corporate Social Responsibility in
Mining in Southern Africa: Fair Accountability or Just Greenwash?, 47
DEVELOPMENT 85 (2004); Birgitta Schwartz & Karina Tilling, ISO-lating
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Organizational Context: A Dissenting
Interpretation of ISO 26000, 16 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 289, 296
(2009); Sandra Waddock, Building a New Institutional Infrastructure for
Corporate Responsibility, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 87, 105 (2008). See Thomas
P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Disclosure
Under Threat of Audit, 20 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 710 (2011), for a
definition of greenwash.
27. See Dan Simon & Keith J. Holyoak, Structural Dynamics of Cognition:
From Consistency Theories to Constraint Satisfaction, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 283, 28485 (2002); William B. Swann, Jr. et al., Self-
Verification: The Search for Coherence, in HANDBOOK OF SELF AND IDENTITY
367, 369 (Mark R. Leary & June Price Tangney eds., 2002).
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trade-offs difficult is both the extent of economic sacrifice that
might be needed in order to achieve certain sustainability goals
and the deep ideological divide that underlies them.
My main objective in this article is to expose the blind
spots underlying the ideas of green economy and shared value
as they are manifested in the CSR domain. I pursue this path
through a close study of sustainability indexes. Sustainability
indexes constitute a perfect test case for the green economy
thesis because they claim to positively affect the sustainability
profile of firms despite the fact that (or precisely because) they
are situated at the heart of modern capitalism: the stock ex-
change. Focusing on sustainability indexes allows me to con-
sider some of the key puzzles underlying the green economy
thesis. I argue and demonstrate through an in-depth analysis
of the two leading players in the global market of sustainability
indexesthe FTSE4Good Index Series (FTSE4Good)28 and the
Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI)29that the capacity of
these schemes to facilitate pro-sustainability changes is limited
by deeply entrenched structural barriers, which reflect the im-
pact of modern capitalism. I consider this argument by looking
into the capacity of these indexes to positively influence the
sustainability profile of firms and by considering their com-
mitment to democratic values.30
In Part II, I begin by outlining the global terrain of private
CSR codes, to which sustainability indexes belong. In Part III, I
proceed to discuss the efficacy of the CSR movement, and revis-
it in this context the green economy thesis at the firm level,
28. FTSE4Good Index Series, FTSE, http://www.ftse.com/products/indices
/FTSE4Good (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
29. DJSI Family Overview, ROBECOSAM, http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/index-family-overview/djsi-family-overview/index.jsp (last visited
Oct. 18, 2015).
30. Whereas the efficacy puzzle questions the capacity of sustainability
indexes to contribute to sustainable development, the democracy puzzle re-
flects a different concern: if we take the view that the FTSE4Good and DJSI
are not just cheap talk, we implicitly recognize them as a new form of global
authority that needs to be legitimized. For a similar argument, see Steven
Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global Governance Be
Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 347, 354 (2007);
Sander Chan & Philipp Pattberg, Private Rule-Making and the Politics of
Accountability: Analyzing Global Forest Governance, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL.
103, 10304 (2008); Allison Loconto & Eve Fouilleux, Politics of Private
Regulation: ISEAL and the Shaping of Transnational Sustainability
Governance, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 166, 167 (2014).
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examining the potential contribution of the CSR movement to
sustainability. I examine both arguments that support the
green economy thesis and some of the systemic barriers that
can undermine it. After these general reflections, Part IV turns
to the field of sustainability indexes, which, as I argued above,
provide a perfect case study for examining the limits of the
green economy thesis. I examine first the steering mechanisms
employed by FTSE4Good and DJSI, and consider in particular
whether these mechanisms allow the indexes to change the
sustainability performance of the firms that are part of their
index universe. Second, I examine the governance structure of
these indexes and consider whether it satisfies the core de-
mands of democratic theory. Drawing on my experience as a
member of the public advisory board of the Tel-Aviv Maala So-
cially Responsible Investment Index,31 I also examine the dif-
ferences between the governance structure of the Tel-Aviv
Maala Socially Responsible Investment Index and those of the
FTSE4Good and DJSI indexes.
The foregoing analysis exposes several critical flaws in the
structure of the FTSE4Good and DJSI, which significantly lim-
it their capacity to trigger pro-sustainability changes in firms
behavior. First, sustainability indexes have to cope with a deep
internal paradox. Although the indexes present themselves as
being driven by a logic of sustainability, and are constructed
through an evaluation process based on sustainability criteria,
after their composition has been determined (through that very
logic) they are marketed as financial instruments that track
changes in the share values of listed firms (without providing a
similar tracking of firms sustainability performance).32 The
intermixing of ordinal sustainability ranking and continuous,
quantitative measurement of financial performance can un-
dermine the capacity of these indexes to facilitate pro-
sustainability changes, both by signalling that financial per-
formance is more valuable than sustainability performance and
31. CSR Index 2015, MAALA, http://www.maala.org.il/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2015).
32. See DJSI Family Overview, supra note 29; FTSE4Good Index Series,
supra note 28. But see FTSE ESG Ratings, FTSE,
http://www.ftse.com/products/indices/F4G-ESG-Ratings (last visited Nov. 18,
2105) (providing access to the company specific FTSE ESG ratings for invest-
ment managers or consultants that wish to license the ratings for use in con-
structing their own actively managed funds, risk analysis, or research).
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by facilitating greenwash behaviour.33 To rectify this flaw, sus-
tainability indexes must develop, I argue, new metrics that can
capture, in a quantitative fashion, the sustainability perfor-
mance of the listed firms and of the index as a whole, and pre-
sent them concurrently with the financial data. I suggest some
ways in which this idea can be achieved.
A second critical flaw of sustainability indexes has to do
with their democratic profile. The institutional structure of
FTSE4Good and DJSI does not provide sufficient participatory
opportunities for civic society voices.34 This democratic deficit
could give corporations undue influence over the way in which
the indexes function. The semi-regulatory powers of sustaina-
bility indexes require that they grant civic players greater op-
portunities to take part in their decision-making processes.
This change would also require the indexes to significantly im-
prove their transparency. Currently, most of the information
that is collected by the indexes in the firms evaluation process,
as well as some of the details of their governance structure, is
not disclosed to the public.35 I discuss these proposed reforms in
greater detail in Part V.
Taken together, the two reforms suggested above could
strengthen the capacity of the FTSE4Good and DJSI to facili-
tate pro-sustainability actions in listed firms. By changing the
asymmetric reporting structure of financial and sustainability
data, sustainability indexes would signal that these two data
sets and the values associated with them enjoy equal norma-
tive standing, which I think is what the notion of green econo-
33. The indexes asymmetric reporting structure does not allow external
observers to accurately analyse the sustainability performance of listed firms
(and consequently the aggregate sustainability performance of the indexes),
while still allowing listed firms, and the index as a whole, to present them-
selves as sustainable because they meet a certain minimal threshold of sus-
tainability. I further elaborate this argument in Section IV.B. below.
34. See, e.g., FTSE RUSSELL, GROUND RULES: FTSE4GOOD INDEX SERIES
§§ 2.12.2 (version 2.3, Oct. 2015) [hereinafter FTSE4GOOD GROUND RULES],
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160108211822/http://www.ftse.com/products/do
wnloads/FTSE4Good_Index_Series.pdf] (stating that a committee consisting of
independent investment professionals experienced in environmental, social
and governance factors and is responsible for advising on the content and
management of the FTSE4Good Index Inclusion Rules).
35. See, e.g., Academic Request, ROBECOSAM, http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/academic-request.jsp (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) (Due to our con-
fidentiality policy, we do not share any scores or sustainability data with third
parties.).
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my is intended to convey. This interpretation of green economy
is consistent with a value-pluralistic understanding of sustain-
ability.36 Furthermore, the development of such symmetrical
disclosure structure would also be critical for understanding
the difficult trade-offs that must be addressed if the global soci-
ety opts for a more sustainable path of development. The need
to address these trade-offs is critical more generally to the suc-
cess of the green economy project.
II. THE LEGAL UNIVERSE OF CSR CODES
To understand the role played by sustainability indexes in
the transnational network of CSR codes, we must consider
more closely the historical process that has led to the current
transnational system of CSR codes. Over the past few years,
global environmental regulation has become a hybrid system
that includes both conventional treaty instrumentsfor exam-
ple, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change37 and the Hong Kong International Convention for the
Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships38and
private instruments. The latter include voluntary corporate
codes,39 environmental management systems,40 green label
36. For a discussion of value-pluralism see infra notes 24653 and accom-
panying text.
37. Background on the UNFCCC, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last
visited Oct. 19, 2015).
38. Intl Maritime Org. [IMO], Hong Kong International Convention for
the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, IMO Doc.
SR/CONF/45 (May 15, 2009), http://www.imo.org/en/About
/conventions/listofconventions/pages/the-hong-kong-international-convention-
for-the-safe-and-environmentally-sound-recycling-of-ships.aspx.
39. E.g., Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises (May 25, 2011).
40. For a discussion of two such environmental management systems, see
Kelly Kollman & Aseem Prakash, EMS-based Environmental Regimes as Club
Goods: Examining Variations in Firm-level Adoption of ISO 14001 and EMAS
in U.K, U.S., and Germany, 35 POLY SCI. 43, 4345, 54 (2002) (discussing the
adoption of ISO 14001 and the European Unions Environmental Management
and Audit System (EMAS)). A third example is the Responsible Care program
developed by the American Chemistry Council. Responsible Care, AM. CHEM-
ISTRY COUNCIL, http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com (last visited
Nov. 2, 2015).
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schemes,41 environmental reporting standards,42 green finan-
cial schemes,43 and green indexes.44
The penetration of private instruments into the global reg-
ulatory system has occurred mostly since the mid-1990s. From
the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the field of voluntary environmen-
tal governance was highly fragmented, mostly consisting of
segregated contractual arrangements and isolated organiza-
tional routines. But since the mid-1990s, the field has expand-
ed and the nature of the field has changed, with new centers of
global governance injecting a great deal of order into the field.
This change has affected all the facets of the governance game,
from how norms are produced and adopted to how regimes are
implemented and enforced. One of the unique features of the
emerging field of private governance is the presence of reinforc-
ing accountability loops from the multiple links and cross-
sensitivities between distinct regimes, that form what I call an
ensemble regulatory structure.45
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed
historical account of this transformative process, from frag-
mented self-regulation to centralized global governance. I focus
therefore on two examples: sustainability reporting and ethical
investment. Consider first the field of sustainability reporting.
41. The Forest Stewardship Council Certification scheme and the U.S.
Energy Star program are two green label programs. For a review of green
labeling schemes, see Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, Eco-labeling for
Energy Efficiency and Sustainability: A Meta-analysis of US Programs, 31
ENERGY POLY 109 (2003).
42. E.g., GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES (2013) [hereinafter G4 GUIDELINES],
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-
Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf; ACCOUNTABILITY, AA1000 ASSUR-
ANCE STANDARD (2008), http://www.accountability.org/standards/aa1000as
/index.html.
43. Green financial schemes include instruments and codes regulating
lending practices and standards for ethical investment. For a discussion of
such schemes, see Oren Perez, The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-
Regulation to Multi-Polar Governance, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-
GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 151
(Olaf Dilling et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Perez, Green Finance].
44. Green indexes include the DJSI and FTSE4Good series. DJSI Family
Overview, supra note 29; FTSE4Good Index Series, supra note 28.
45. For a more in-depth exposition of how ensemble regulation occurs
among globalized, intertwined governance regimes, see Oren Perez, Private
Environmental Governance as Ensemble Regulation: A Critical Exploration of
Sustainability Indexes and the New Ensemble Politics, 12 THEORETICAL IN-
QUIRIES L. 543, 54858 (2011) [hereinafter Perez, Ensemble Regulation].
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Firms, especially multinational enterprises (MNEs), have been
publishing different types of non-financial information since
the 1980s, but their social/environmental reporting has varied
greatly in content and form.46 Although there were processes of
convergence and reciprocal learning between firms,47 there was
no central coordination.
Over the past fifteen years, the disordered sustainability
reporting landscape of the 1990s was transformed into a much
more ordered process owing to the emergence of global private
codes that have established clear rules and principles for sus-
tainability reporting and external assurance. The most im-
portant code has proven to be the set of reporting standards
produced by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI
first published its set of guidelines for sustainability reporting
in 2002; the most recent version, G4, was published in 2013.48
The objective of the GRI Guidelines is to help organizations to
set goals, measure performance, and manage change in order
to make their operations more sustainable.49 The GRI Guide-
lines offer Reporting Principles, Standard Disclosures and an
Implementation Manual for the preparation of sustainability
reports by organizations, regardless of their size, sector or loca-
tion.50 The 2013 Guidelines require organizations to provide
46. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., DISCLOSURE OF THE IMPACT OF
CORPORATIONS ON SOCIETY: CURRENT TRENDS AND ISSUES, at 2632, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/2003/7, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.18 (Aug. 26, 2004)
(listing examples of reporting formats); Josephine Maltby, Setting Its Own
Standards and Meeting Those Standards: Voluntarism Versus Regulation in
Environmental Reporting, 6 BUS. STRATEGY & ENVT 83, 84 (1997) (Speakers
attempted to identify . . . to whom environmental reports should be addressed,
the purpose of reporting, the information needed by users and the mecha-
nisms . . . to ensure . . . reporting was carried out. No clear consensus emerged
about any of these issues.); Waddock, supra note 26, at 93 (Because . . . there
were no guidelines . . . companies mainly reported what they wanted to, in
formats they desired, typically focusing only on positive activities.).
47. See Carol Ann Tilt, The Content and Disclosure of Australian Corpo-
rate Environmental Policies, 14 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 190,
20507 (2001) (noting how firms learn from each others practices, but ulti-
mately concluding that there is a lack of an integrated approach to disclo-
sures).
48. G4 GUIDELINES, supra note 42. In the following discussion, I will refer
to the 2013 G4 Guidelines only.
49. Id. at 3.
50. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE & INTL ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
GRI G4 GUIDELINES AND ISO 26000:2010 HOW TO USE THE GRI G4 GUIDE-
LINES AND ISO 26000 IN CONJUNCTION 2 (2014), http://www.iso.org/iso/iso-gri-
26000_2014-01-28.pdf.
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information on the economic, environmental, and social aspects
of their activities.51 This choice is based on the idea that [t]he
underlying question of sustainability reporting is how an or-
ganization contributes, or aims to contribute in the future, to
the improvement or deterioration of economic, environmental
and social conditions, developments and trends at the local, re-
gional or global level.52 The GRI Guidelines dominate the
global arena of sustainability reporting, having a particularly
strong influence on the disclosure practices of MNEs.53
This process of global convergence in reporting has been
supported by two intertwined processes. First was the incorpo-
ration of disclosure requirements in other CSR instruments.
For example, ISO 14001, the European Unions Eco-Audit and
Management Scheme (EMAS), and Responsible Care, which all
contain extensive disclosure requirements.54 These require-
ments also form part of the ranking criteria used by the
FTSE4Good and DJSI.55 Similarly, the 2013 Equator Principles
51. G4 GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 2123.
52. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, GRI G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES: IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 10 (2013),
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part2-
Implementation-Manual.pdf.
53. Seventy eight percent of reporting companies worldwide refer to
the GRI reporting guidelines in their CR reports, a rise of 9 per-
centage points since the 2011 survey (over 90 percent do so in
South Korea, South Africa, Portugal, Chile, Brazil and Sweden).
Among the worlds 250 largest companies the rate is even high-
er . . . 82 percent of G250 companies that report on CR refer to the
GRI guidelines as opposed to 78 percent in 2011.
KPMG, THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2013,
at 11 (2014). For a comprehensive list of firms using the GRI guidelines, see
Sustainability Disclosure Database, GRI, http://database.globalreporting.org
/search (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Although there are other initiatives, such as
the International Integrated Reporting Framework and the Carbon Disclosure
Project, they do not threaten the hegemony of the GRI and should be regarded
as complementary. See, e.g., INTL INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL <IR> FRAMEWORK: INTEGRATED REPORTING (2013),
http://www.theiirc.org/international-ir-framework/; Catalyzing Business and
Government Action, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/About-Us.aspx
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
54. See generally Kollman & Prakash, supra note 40 (examining varia-
tions in adoption of environmental management systems); Lyon & Maxwell,
supra note 26, at 28 ([M]any U.S. firms elect not to adopt ISO
14001 . . . because they wish to limit public access to internal information
about their environmental performance.).
55. FTSE criteria includes a commitment for public reporting to describe
the main impacts of the firm, including quantitative data and performance
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require each subscribing institution to publish an annual re-
port elaborating on the way it has implemented the Princi-
ples.56
A second line of support was provided by new public regu-
lation. National securities regulators have recognized that the
disclosure requirements placed on publicly-traded companies
by securities laws require more extensive disclosure of envi-
ronmental data for a proper assessment of a firms material
business risks and economic situation.57
Another important change has been the emergence of
mandatory pollution emissions disclosure programs, such as
against targets. See FTSE, FTSE ESG RATINGS: INTEGRATING ESG INTO IN-
VESTMENTS AND STEWARDSHIP 2 (2014), http://www.ftse.com/products
/downloads/FTSE-ESG-Methodology-and-Usage-Summary-Short.pdf (A di-
verse range of indicators are employed . . . [including] indicators assessing
quality of management . . . , corporate data disclosure . . . , [and] quantitative
data [used] to make performance judgments.). DJSI Assessment Criteria also
include a requirement of environmental and social reporting. See
ROBECOSAM, CSA GUIDE - ROBECOSAMS CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AS-
SESSMENT METHODOLOGY 1820 (version 2.0, Apr. 2015) [hereinafter
ROBECOSAM, CSA METHODOLOGY], http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/images/corporate-sustainability-assessment-methodology-
guidebook.pdf (An integral component of the Corporate Sustainability As-
sessment is . . . to identify companies involvement and response to environ-
mental, economic and social crisis situations.).
56. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES III 1011 (2013),
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf (The
EPFI will report publicly, at least annually . . . on its Equator Principles im-
plementation process and experience.).
57. E.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 300-N-01-008, U.S. EPA NOTI-
FYING DEFENDANTS OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSIONS ENVIRON-
MENTAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (2001); see also E. Lynn Grayson et al.,
SEC Disclosure Obligations: Increasing Scrutiny on Environmental Liabilities
and Climate Change Impacts, in ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 447, 45364 (Lawrence P. Schnapf ed. 2011) (providing a his-
torical overview of SEC enforcement over insufficient disclosure of existing
environmental liabilities and prospective business risks due to environmental
risks, and discussing new developments in environmental disclosures includ-
ing the SECs 2010 guidance on disclosing climate change related risks). For a
general overview of sustainability disclosure requirements in different stock
exchanges, see SUSTAINABLE STOCK EXCHANGES INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABLE
STOCK EXCHANGES REPORT ON PROGRESS 2014 (2014),
http://www.sseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/SSE-2014-ROP.pdf;
see also Oren Perez, Facing the Global Hydra: Ecological Transformation at
the Global Financial Frontier: The Ambitious Case of the Global Reporting
Initiative, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND
SOCIAL REGULATION 459, 46572 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Peters-
mann eds., 2006).
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the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program,58 the Euro-
pean Pollution Emissions Register (EPER),59 and the Canadian
National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI)60which have
extended the disclosure obligations of firm.61 But the GRI
scheme goes beyond the requirements set by these state-
sponsored disclosure programs: by extending the disclosure re-
quirements to ethical and labor issues; by expanding the scope
and scale of environmental data disclosures; and by basing the
disclosure requirements on principles that are not economically
defined notions of materiality.62
The GRI Guidelines offer reporting firms the option of hav-
ing the report reviewed by a third party.63 The growth in the
number of firms that publish sustainability reports has also
generated a demand for independent external assurance.64 Two
prominent global codes in the emerging field of external assur-
ance are the 2013 Revised International Standard on Assur-
ance Engagements, ISAE 3000promulgated by the Interna-
tional Auditing and Assurance Standards Board65and the
58. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGEN-
CY, http://www.epa.gov/tri (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
59. Home, EUR. POLLUTANT RELEASE & TRANSFER REG.,
http://prtr.ec.europa.eu (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
60. National Pollutant Release Inventory, ENVT CAN., http://www.ec.gc.ca
/inrp-npri (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
61. Several European countries have taken a more radical approach to
environmental disclosures, and now require large or state-owned companies to
publish sustainability reports. See, e.g., Danish Legal Framework, CORP. SUS-
TAINABILITY REPORTING, http://www.reportingcsr.org/_denmark-p-46.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015); Swedish Legal Framework, CORP. SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING, http://www.reportingcsr.org/_sweden-p-50.html (last visited Oct.
14, 2015).
62. G4 GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 9, 1618, 2023.
63. Id. at 36 (describing assurance standards); see also GLOBAL REPORT-
ING INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 51.
64. See generally Roger Simnett et al., Assurance on Sustainability Re-
ports: An International Comparison, 84 ACCT. REV. 937, 937 (2009)
([C]ompanies seeking to enhance the credibility of their reports and build
their corporate reputation are more likely to have their sustainability reports
assured, although it does not matter whether the assurance provider comes
from the auditing profession. We also find that companies operating in stake-
holder-orientated countries are more likely to choose the auditing profession
as an assurer.).
65. INTL AUDITING & ASSURANCE STANDARDS BD., ISAE 3000 (REVISED),
ASSURANCE ENGAGEMENTS OTHER THAN AUDITS OR REVIEWS OF HISTORICAL
FINANCIAL INFORMATION (2013), http://www.ifac.org/publications-
resources/international-standard-assurance-engagements-isae-3000-revised-
assurance-enga.
2016] THE GREEN ECONOMY PARADOX 169
2008 AccountAbility, AA1000 Assurance Standard.66 The GRI
Guidelines also include various references to other external as-
surance standards.67
Another example of private ordering going global is the
field of socially responsible investment (SRI) or ethical invest-
ment. SRI is an investment discipline that considers environ-
mental, social and corporate governance (ESG) criteria to gen-
erate long-term competitive financial returns and positive
societal impact.68 From a legal perspective, SRI is a form of
private rule-making, whereby a private investor contracts with
financial institutions to invest within certain rules that are de-
signed and offered by the financial institution. Thus, SRI is
both a process of self-regulation and standard contracting. SRI
processes have evolved along a highly fragmented path,69 with
each financial institution developing its own set of investment
criteria based on different types of information, at times relying
on external consultants. This disordered picture has improved
as new centers of governance have evolved, such as United Na-
tions Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI)
Principles for Responsible Investment, the Equator Principles,
and sustainability indexes (which are the focus of this paper).70
66. See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 42.
67. G4 GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 8789.
68. SRI Basics, USSIF, http://www.ussif.org/sribasics (last visited Oct. 14,
2015).
69. Commission of the European Communities Green Paper on Promoting
a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, ¶¶ 8488, COM
(2001) 366 final (July 18, 2001) (SRI is an emerging market with many spe-
cialised screening agencies . . . using a number of different tools and met-
rics . . . . [C]ompanies seem overloaded with excessive and divergent infor-
mation requests. Thus a further expansion of SRI may . . . need for more
convergence between indicators developed by companies and the criteria used
by analysts to assess a companys social and environmental performance. Fur-
thermore, the lack of transparency in evaluation methods . . . may also re-
strain . . . significant socially responsible investments. There is, therefore, a
need for further standardisation, harmonisation and transparency in screen-
ing tools and metrics used by screening agencies.).
70. See generally Perez, Green Finance, supra note 43 (describing the
various instruments that constitute the new field of green finance, distin-
guishing between three fields of financial regulation: project finance, ethical-
green investment, and environmental reporting, and discussing the causal
question over how efficient green finance has been in changing social practic-
es); EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 56; The Six Principles, PRINCIPLES RE-
SPONSIBLE INV., http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/ (last visited
Nov. 13, 2015).
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These new schemes provide a general regulatory frame-
work to the ethical investment market. For example, according
to the UNEP FI Principles for Responsible Investment, the sig-
natories (institutional investors) commit to: incorporating ESG
issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes;
seeking appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in
which they invest; and, reporting on their activities and pro-
gress toward implementing the Principles.71 Similarly, the
Equator Principles provide a risk management framework for
financial institutions, for determining, assessing, and manag-
ing environmental and social risks in financed projects.72 They
are primarily intended to provide a minimum standard for due
diligence to support responsible risk assessment processes in
financial decision-making.73 Sustainable indexes constitute an-
other important element in this governance network by creat-
ing a detailed evaluative framework, which can be used to im-
plement the vision of SRI.74
III. REVISITING THE GREEN ECONOMY THESIS AT THE
FIRM LEVEL: HOW FAR CAN THE CSR MOVEMENT TAKE
US?
A. CSR CODES AND BEYOND COMPLIANCE ACTION: TWO
PERSPECTIVES
The green economy and shared value concepts are based on
the thesis that capitalism and sustainable development are not
entirely at odds with each other. This means that there are
possible development paths, what the literature describes as
green growth, which would allow states and firms to grow
and make profits within the constraints of sustainability.75 In
this section, I consider this thesis at the firm level, looking at
two related dilemmas: whether (and under what circumstanc-
es) firms would be expected to take beyond-compliance, pro-
71. The Six Principles, supra note 70 (principles one, three, and six).
72. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, at 5 ([T]he EPFI will . . . cate-
gorise it based on the magnitude of its potential environmental and social
risks and impacts.).
73. Id. at 1617.
74. See Perez, Green Finance, supra note 43, at 16061.
75. This view is consistent with the common definition of green growth as
making growth processes resource-efficient, cleaner and more resilient with-
out necessarily slowing them. Hallegatte et al., supra note 5, at 2.
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sustainability actions, and whether CSR codes can influence
firms, as the codes commonly claim they can, to take such ac-
tions.
The green economy and shared value theses challenge the
skeptical voice that portrays the firm as an amoral economic
optimizing machine and the CSR movement as an exercise in
greenwash. This challenge has strong foundations in modern
theories of the firm, which draw both on insights from behav-
ioral economicsdemonstrating, for example, the prevalence of
financially-irrational altruistic behavior76and on complex in-
stitutionalist modelssuch as the firm as a polyphonic organi-
zation.77 It also reflects a more complex understanding of the
structure and dynamics of the global network of CSR codes (the
ensemble regulation thesis).78 But, as I elaborate below, the
76. See, e.g., Hessel Oosterbeek et al., Cultural Differences in Ultimatum
Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, 7 EXPERIMENTAL ECON.
171 (2004) (documenting the prevalence of altruistic strategies in a classic
behavioral economics game; an outcome that runs counter to the prediction of
traditional economics that presumes financially-selfish behavior); see also,
Joseph Henrich et al., Economic Man in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behav-
ioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 795,
81618, 839 (2005) (discussing observations of financially-irrational altruistic
behavior).
77. See, e.g., François Cooren et al., Communication, Organizing and Or-
ganization: An Overview and Introduction to the Special Issue, 32 ORG. STUD.
1149 (2011) (discussing scholarship developing the COOCommunicative
Constitution of Organizationapproach that views organizations as consti-
tuted in and through human communications, views communication as the
means by which organizations are established, composed, designed, and sus-
tained, and rejects the existing conception of organizations as objects, enti-
ties, or social facts inside of which communication occurs); Oren Perez et al.,
The Dynamic of Corporate Self-Regulation: ISO 14001, Environmental Com-
mitment, and Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 43 L. & SOCY REV. 593,
59497 (2009) [hereinafter Perez et al., Corporate Self-Regulation] (arguing
that the polyphonic model provides a coherent framework for thinking about
the way in which different logics intertwine in the context of the modern cor-
poration); Dennis Schoeneborn, Organization as Communication: A Luh-
mannian Perspective, 25 MGMT. COMM. Q. 663 (2011) (highlighting aspects of
Niklas Luhmanns theory of social systems that explain organizations as con-
stituted by communication, how that defines the organization as fundamental-
ly and paradoxically contingent and ephemeral, but also allows for almost
continual potential for transformation).
78. See Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 54344 ([T]his new
ensemble network has brought about a new transnational political sphere
which is associated with an extensive, cross-institutional quest for legitima-
cy.).
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green economy literature overestimates the strength of the
win-win argument.
What are the motivations that may bring a firm to aban-
don its business-as-usual strategy and adopt a more sustaina-
ble business model? There are competing views on this question
in the literature. The claim that the corporate order is domi-
nated by a logic of consequences, what I will refer to as the
economic optimizer model,79 adopts a highly instrumental ap-
proach to this question. Such an approach would argue firms
take beyond-compliance actions (e.g., implementing CSR com-
mitments) either if these actions correct sub-optimalities in
their operational processes (e.g., generating more efficient use
of energy) or produce reputational gains that outweigh the as-
sociated costs.80 Economists distinguish in this context between
strategic CSR, which is economically justified, and altruistic
CSR, which requires firms to forego profits.81 From the per-
spective of agency cost theory, altruistic CSR is viewed as a
case of corporate governance failure, the result of the ability of
under-monitored managers to use corporate resources towards
their own ideological agenda.82
79. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of
International Political Orders, 52 INTL ORG. 943, 94951, 954 (1998); James
G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Logic of Appropriateness, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 689 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2008).
80. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental
Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 307
(2004) (investigating why paper pulp factories emit pollution lower than legal
limits and take other actions that go beyond mere compliance with regulatory
requirements).
81. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Corporate Social Responsibility
and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. POLY
240, 241 (2008) (distinguishing between CSR (which is driven by altruistic
motives and is unprofitable) from strategic CSR (which is profitable)). But cf.
Forest L. Reinhardt, et al., Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Eco-
nomic Lens, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. POLY 219, 232 (2008) (The bulk of the
available evidence suggests that most firms view socially responsible actions
in the same way that they view more traditional business activities, such as
advertising and R&D. Instead of altruistically sacrificing profits, they engage
in a more limitedbut more profitableset of socially beneficial activities
that contributes to their financial goals.).
82. As discussed previously in Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45,
at 563 n.80, from this perspective, altruistic CSR is no different from the
greed capitalism that characterized the 2009 financial crisis. The solutions
are also similar: the adoption of organizational or incentive-based mechanisms
ensuring that the incentives of managers and shareholders are aligned. See
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
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This instrumental view also leads to some skepticism
about the capacity of soft-law instruments to bring about signif-
icant pro-sustainability changes.83 This skepticism arises be-
cause first, it is assumed that a firm would not bear the costs of
joining a CSR scheme, in direct expenses or diverted personnel
time, unless these costs can be economically justified by result-
ing gains (e.g., by operational efficiency or reputational gains).
This creates an economic cap on the potential impact of CSR
programs. Second, skeptics would note that joining a CSR pro-
gram does not necessarily guarantee that a firm will comply
with the provisions in substance or spirit. The instrumental
view would assume that if a firm can benefit from the reputa-
tion gain associated with a CSR program without improving its
environmental performance or genuinely changing its behavior,
it would presumably choose this option. Under this approach,
the question of whether firms will comply with the provisions of
the CSR code and generate significant environmental benefits
depends strictly on the strength of the enforcement framework
associated with the regime.
The economic optimizer model still allows for the possibil-
ity that some voluntary codes may yield beyond-compliance ac-
tions. But, such a result must be grounded, as noted above, in
the firms economic logic. For example, Potoski and Prakashs
green club model suggests that firms would pursue ISO
14001 certification or meeting the inclusion criteria of DJSI
and FTSE4Good because of the potential contribution of these
codes to their reputation.84 With regard to ISO 14001, they ar-
247, 250 (2010) (At the international level, the Basel II framework has been
recently amended to require banking regulators to monitor compensation
structures with a view towards aligning them with good risk management.);
Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULA-
TION (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009).
83. For studies using the economic viewpoint, see ASEEM PRAKASH &
MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN CLUBS,
ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 41, 7880 (2006);
Gary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 691, 707
(2003); Kollman & Prakash, supra note 40.
84. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 83, at 49 (Affiliating with a green
clubs positive brand reputation can benefit club members . . . [and is] akin to
building organizational reputations . . . [which] shape stakeholders interac-
tions with the organization.). The issue of reputation may be viewed also from
the perspective of stakeholder theory, which highlights the way in which ex-
ternal stakeholders may influence the firm. Gunningham argues that firms
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gue that because this scheme includes a relatively effective
process for external verification, firms can only capture the
reputational benefits of the standard by undertaking a genuine
effort at implementation.85 Both DJSI and FTSE4Good have a
relatively robust compliance system, and a tradition of en-
gagement with companies,86 suggesting that a similar argu-
ment can be made with regard to them as well.
The economic optimizer model provides, therefore, limited
support for the green economy thesis because it subjects any
pro-sustainability action to a strict cost-benefit test that is in-
different to sustainability values in and of themselves. A some-
what more nuanced approach to the green economy thesis,
which can explain why firms might take pro-sustainability ac-
tions beyond those predicted by the economic optimizer model,
can be found in institutionalist models of the firm. Below I dis-
cuss two potential interpretations of the institutionalist
framework which look at the firm and the global CSR system:
(a) the firm as a polyphonic system and (b) the global CSR net-
work as an ensemble regulatory system.87
In the polyphonic model, the firm is conceptualized as a
dynamic, self-organized decision-processing system that is not
governed by one rationality, but can accommodate multiple
logics.88 The calculative logic of profit maximization that is pre-
sumed by traditional economics to govern firm behavior, alt-
hough important, would only constitute one of multiple co-
operate under a multifaceted license to operate, reflecting the multiple
claims with which they must contend (economic, social, and legal). Gunning-
ham et al., supra note 80, at 329. The adoption and implementation of soft law
obligations constitutes a rational response, from the economic point of view, to
these pressures. Id. at 32628; Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The
Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications,
20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 75 (1995). Stakeholder theory also has a normative
facet that argues contrary to the agency-cost model, that managers ought to
protect and promote the interests of multiple stakeholders, not only those of
shareholders. Thomas Donaldson, Making Stakeholder Theory Whole, 24
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 237, 238 (1999).
85. PRAKASH & POTOSKI supra note 83, at 78, 9296 (outlining the effect
of rigorous external assurance in ISO 14001 on how firms approach imple-
menting the standard and gaining reputational benefits).
86. See infra notes 16474 and accompanying text; see also Perez, Ensem-
ble Regulation, supra note 45, at 57072.
87. On the polyphonic model, see further Perez et al., Corporate Self-
Regulation, supra note 77, at 594602. On the idea of ensemble regulation, see
Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 54850, 56162.
88. See Perez et al., Corporate Self-Regulation, supra note 77, at 59596.
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existing logics in the polyphonic model. One of the key aspects
of the firm that is highlighted by the polyphonic model is the
iterative and reciprocal interaction between the firms struc-
ture and culture and employees attitudes and beliefs.89 In this
context, the firm can be understood as an autonomous commu-
nicative system that is continually interacting with its consti-
tutive workers in a reciprocal process of structural coupling.90
The polyphonic model extends down to individuals in the firm,
who are understood with a pluralistic concept of the self that
includes the possibility that managers, employees, and share-
holders are affected and driven by a complex set of motiva-
tions.91
The polyphonic model sheds new light on the institutional
dynamic generated through the adoption of a CSR code by the
firm.92 Adoption of a CSR code introduces new routines into the
firm and requires the firm to observe itself in a different light,
which creates new discursive venues where firms must account
for their actions both externally and internally. Through these
new internal routines, standards such as ISO 14001, the Equa-
tor Principles, the GRI Guidelines, or sustainability indexes,
can change the internal dynamics of the firm, moving it into a
new equilibrium between the firms various motivations and
logics. This new equilibrium would combine environmental and
economic goals, and would reflect a greater sensitivity to eco-
logical concerns, even at the cost of reduced profitability. For
example, a firm implementing ISO 14001 would adopt various
routines underlying the codes Environmental Management
System (EMS) requirement, and would result in environmental
concerns receiving stronger representation in decision-making
processes. By inserting these new routines, the firms structure
would then allow for the discursive expression of motivations
89. See id. at 597.
90. See id.
91. Id.; see, e.g., BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE IN-
VESTMENT LAW: REGULATING THE UNSEEN POLLUTERS 18085 (2008) (discuss-
ing effects on firm behavior due to shareholder activism that reflects divergent
motivations among shareholders and firm management); Sumantra Ghoshal,
Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices, 4
ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75, 8286 (2005) (highlighting the need for
management theory to incorporate more pluralistic concepts of individual mo-
tivation given the limitations of focusing on self-interest and opportunism as
drivers of individual motivation).
92. See Perez et al., Corporate Self-Regulation, supra note 77, at 597601.
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and ideas that may have been suppressed or ignored under the
previous regime.93 When a firm uses new routines for selecting,
ordering, and processing information, it changes the trajectory
and cognitive horizon of the organization, for example, by ena-
bling the generation of environmentally-related data that was
not available to the organization or considered in decision-
making under the old routines.94
Another important process highlighted by viewing the firm
under the polyphonic model is the potential virtuous cycle that
adopting CSR codes, such as ISO 14001, can generate between
the new organizational reality and the individual motivations
and beliefs of employees and shareholders.95 This dynamic is
properly understood as a cycle, because it creates a potential
for amplifying feedback between the organizational and indi-
vidual levels. The transformation of the institutional culture
through new routines facilitates changes at the individual
mental level, for example, by enhancing environmental com-
mitment and loyalty to the organization. This, in turn, supports
the institutional changes created by the voluntary standard, for
example, by increasing the employees willingness to invoke
and apply the new conceptual apparatus inherited from the
standard, and to implement the new routines.
A virtuous cycle between organizational and individual
levels can uncover and develop human and economic resources
that were invisible under the previous organizational setting.
These resources are developed because the new routines and
the virtuous cycle have increased both the employees internal-
ly-driven willingness to think strategically about, and engage
in, pro-environmental behaviors and their commitment to the
organization.96 These two changes can help explain the capaci-
ty of voluntary green standards to create enduring changes
93. See id. at 598.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 599600; see also C.B. Bhattacharya et al., Strengthening
Stakeholder-Company Relationships Through Mutually Beneficial Corporate
Social Responsibility Initiatives, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 257, 257 (2009) ([I]n the
employment realm, CSR activity has been shown to have a positive effect on
job seeking intent, as well as behaviors on the job like interpersonal coopera-
tion and job-related effort. (citations omitted)).
96. For an empirical analysis supporting these claims, see Perez et al.,
Corporate Self-Regulation, supra note 77, at 60322; Francesco Perrini et al.,
Deconstructing the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial
Performance, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 59, 63 (2011).
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within firms and how firms can bear the financial and person-
nel time costs of certification (e.g., ISO 14001) without com-
promising profits. A firms implementation of a voluntary green
standard can thus form the impetus for the creation of a corpo-
rate culture that is informed by social norms, rather than driv-
en exclusively by economic incentives.97
Evaluating the firm at an institutionally sensitive frame of
observation like under the polyphonic model highlights the im-
portance of analyzing the broader institutional setting that dis-
tinct CSR instruments operate within. This frame is especially
important for understanding how the ensemble structure of the
new global order of private CSR regulation and public incen-
tives affects the efficacy of any individual CSR scheme.98 By
ensemble regulation I refer to the combination of multiple au-
tonomous regulatory schemes that together form a regulatory
network that enforces a common core of basic principles and
from which develops positive enforcement and normative ex-
ternalities (positive complementarities).99 The ensemble struc-
ture of the global CSR network has two effects. First, the cross-
linkages between common elements of different standards cre-
ate a system of positive enforcement externalities, where the
requirements of one regime can also serve to bolster compliance
with the other regimes that comprise the network, thus gener-
ating an amplified compliance effect. The consequence of this
cross-linked network of ensemble regulatory structures is that
firms participating in the world of CSR will find it increasingly
difficult to reap the various reputational gains associated with
adopting voluntary CSR codes if they do not make real organi-
zational efforts at implementation and change.100 For example,
once a firm is publishing environmental reports under the GRI
97. See Perez et al., Corporate Self-Regulation, supra note 77, at 60001;
see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 8083 (2008); Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, VA. L. REV. 733, 74952 (2007); Lynn A.
Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Dont Want
to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9
(2003).
98. See Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 54950.
99. I have developed and deployed this concept in a number of earlier
works, see, for example, id. at 54850, 56162; Perez, Green Finance, supra
note 43, at 163, 17476.
100. This cross-regime effect is neglected by some authors, see, for exam-
ple, Schwartz & Tilling, supra note 26, at 296.
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guidelines, has adopted ISO 14001, and has met the inclusion
criteria for a sustainability index like FTSE4Good or DJSI, it
would be difficult to renege or gloss over environmental com-
mitments as they are now multi-dimensional promises.
But the ensemble structure of this new private order has also
another, more subtle effect. There is a positive feedback between the
multi-focal invocation of the idea of sustainability across the ensem-
ble, the social standing of the idea as a moral-political principle, and
the perceived legitimacy of the ensemble and of each of its constituent
regimes. The mutual engagement with the concept of sustainability
through the distinct regime-spaces and the normative cross-reference
it facilitates is thus also a source of positive normative externality.101
The foregoing analysis has tentative empirical support in
the literature. For example, multiple studies have documented
a positive effect from implementing ISO 14001 on both increas-
ing the environmental commitment and decreasing the ecologi-
cal footprint of firms.102 Other studies have documented a simi-
lar but less pronounced positive influence on firms
sustainability performance from inclusion in sustainability in-
dexes,103 and to the positive effect of the Equator Principles on
the global financial market.104 But other studies have demon-
strated that certain prominent CSR schemes, such as Global
Compact105 and Responsible Care,106 have failed to bring about
101. Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 561.
102. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 83, at 14670; Perez et al., Corporate
Self-Regulation, supra note 77, at 60322. See generally Aaron K. Chatterji &
Michael W. Toffel, How Firms Respond to Being Rated, 31 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 917, 918 (2010) (discussing their study indicating firms respond positively
to environmental ratings).
103. See Chatterji & Toffel, supra note 102; Craig Mackenzie et al., Do
Responsible Investment Indices Improve Corporate Social Responsibility?
FTSE4Goods Impact on Environmental Management, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE,
495, 510 (2013); Rieneke Slager, What Gets Measured Gets Managed  Ex-
ploring the Link Between Sustainability Indices and Responsible Corporate
Behaviour (2009) (unpublished article), http://backup.oikos-
international.org/fileadmin/oikos-international/international
/PRI_Academy/paper/oikosPRI_paper_RienekeSlager.pdf.
104. John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Global Banks as Global Sus-
tainability Regulators?: The Equator Principles, 33 L. & POLY 542, 546 (2011);
Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustaina-
ble Development: An Empirical Assessment of the Implementation of the Equa-
tor Principles, 45 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 487, 577 (2012).
105. Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, Bluewashing the Firm?: Volun-
tary Regulations, Program Design and Member Compliance with the United
Nations Global Compact, 43 POLY. STUD. J. 115, 116 (2014).
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an improvement in the sustainability performance of their sig-
natories, relative to non-signatories.
B. THE STRUCTURAL LIMITS OF THE CSR AND GREEN ECONOMY
PROJECTS
The institutionalist framework (as manifested in the poly-
phonic and ensemble regulation models) provides a more opti-
mistic view regarding the capacity of green economy ideas to
transform the way corporations do business. However, even
within this more optimistic framework the green economy the-
sis and the CSR movementwhich implements it at the corpo-
rate domainface significant limitations. Although it is a mis-
take to dismiss the CSR movement as mere cheap talk, we
must be realistic about the capacity of CSR codes to trigger rad-
ical pro-sustainability changes. The CSR project remains con-
strained by the precepts of modern capitalism and by the broad
institutional framework in which both corporations and CSR
institutions are situated. There is no room within the institu-
tional setting of the CSR project for challenging the basic prin-
ciples of the global financial system, with its demand for profit
and the evaluative metrics associated with this demand. The
green economy model is constrained by the basic presupposi-
tions upon which the current global capitalist order is based,
and it does not offer a way to criticize this order.
One way of making these limitations explicit is to point out
the failure of the Rio+20 concluding document to acknowledge
and openly discuss the difficult tradeoffs involved in imple-
menting green growth policies.107 These tradeoffs are present
both at the national level and at the firm level. Investing in
pro-sustainability actions can create the following tradeoffs be-
tween sustainability and economic production, which ultimate-
ly can reduce the profitability of the firm. These tradeoffs come
in two primary forms:108
(1) Pro-sustainability actions can reduce productivity by
causing firms to use more expensive or less productive
technologies. Examples include using renewable energy
106. E.g., Shanti Gamper-Rabindran & Stephen R. Finger, Does Industry
Self-regulation Reduce Pollution? Responsible Care in the Chemical Industry,
43 J. REG. ECON. 1, 26 (2013).
107. See Barbier, supra note 5.
108. See Hallegatte et al., supra note 5.
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sources that are more costly than coal or petrol,109 hiring
people with disabilities,110 and providing longer maternity
leaves beyond what is required by law.111
(2) Pro-sustainability actions can result in the early
retirement of physical capital,112 if it is based on polluting
or non-sustainable technologies (e.g., a building that is not
suited for people with disabilities113).
Although some of these actions may produce benefits that
outweigh the costs by increasing the effective quantity of pro-
duction inputs (e.g., water or energy), others may not have such
effects either because their positive effects occur outside the
firm, or because the costs outweigh the associated benefits, or
because the benefits will emerge only in the distant future.
From a social perspective, a reduction in economic productivity
at the firm level due to pro-sustainability actions may be justi-
fied by a decrease in external adverse effects (pollution), by
contribution to external positive effects (e.g., increased welfare
gains achieved by the integration of disabled people in the
community), or by non-instrumental conception of the good so-
ciety. However, these positive external effects are not reflected
in the accounts of the firm. In Porter and Kramers shared val-
ue narrative,114 these tradeoffs are blurred. Furthermore, the
difficulty of firms is exacerbated by the fact that they are still
being judged primarily by their financial and not by their sus-
109. Id. at 8.
110. See Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, REGULATION, Spring 2000, at 21, 21 (The added cost of
employing disabled workers to comply with the accommodation mandate of
ADA has made those workers relatively unattractive to firms.); Karen
Needels, Framework for Employer Decision-Making, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COSTS AND BENEFITS TO EMPLOYERS OF RETAINING, RECRUITING AND EM-
PLOYING DISABLED PEOPLE AND/OR PEOPLE WITH HEALTH CONDITIONS OR AN
INJURY 23, 34 (Karen Needels & Robert Schmitz eds., 2006) (noting monetary
effects of employing disabled people, such as the cost of workplace adjust-
ments or the benefits or costs that arise due to different productivity levels for
disabled and non-disabled workers).
111. See Nita Ghei, The Argument Against Paid Family Leave, NEWSWEEK
(Aug. 4, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/argument-against-paid-
family-leave-78741 (Mandated paid family leave makes it more expensive to
hire workers.). See generally Maternity & Parental Leave, AUSTL. GOVT
FAIRWORK OMBUDSMAN, http://www.fairwork.gov.au/Leave/maternity-and-
parental-leave (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
112. Hallegatte et al., supra note 5, at 8.
113. See Needels, supra note 110.
114. See Porter & Kramer, Creating Shared Value, supra note 12.
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tainability performance. As I argue below, this evaluative bias
is present even when it comes to sustainability indexes.
Naturally, these tradeoffs also exist at the level of the
economy as a whole. In considering whether to introduce some
pro-sustainability regulation, such as a carbon tax,115 protec-
tion of rare species (e.g., the endangered Indian tiger),116 pro-
longed maternal or parental leave,117 or mandatory targets for
hiring of people with disabilities,118 governments would have to
weigh the potential benefits of such actions against their pro-
jected costs. But unlike firms, governments must take into ac-
count also those benefits that occur outside firms, such as
health benefits due to reduced air pollution or the improvement
in the lives of people with disabilities when their prospects of
getting a job increase.119 At the same time, it is clearly mistak-
en to claim that environmental and social benefits necessarily
outweigh the costs of achieving them by focusing on only the
narrow sense of benefitimproving firm productivity. Climate
change is a case in point. Making the reductions in global emis-
sions that are needed in order to prevent a dangerous deterio-
115. See Edward Barbier, Sustainability: Tax Societal Ills to Save the
Planet, 483 NATURE 30, 30 (2012); John C. V. Pezzey & Frank Jotzo, Carbon
Tax Needs Thresholds to Reach Its Full Potential, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
1008, 100811 (2013).
116. See Species: Tiger, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,
http://www.worldwildlife.org/species/tiger (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
117. See, e.g., JOAN BLADES & KRISTIN ROWE-FINKBEINER, THE
MOTHERHOOD MANIFESTO: WHAT AMERICAS MOMS WANT AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 2047 (2006) (describing the reality of navigating work, finances,
and having children in the United States, and for advocating paid family leave
policies).
118. See, e.g., DISABILITY INV. GRP., THE WAY FORWARD: A NEW
DISABILITY POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR AUSTRALIA 4448 (2009),
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/dig_report_19oct
09.pdf; DISABILITY EMP. AUSTL., IMPROVING THE EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION
OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITY IN AUSTRALIA: A RESPONSE FROM DISABILITY
EMPLOYMENT AUSTRALIA 1213 (2013), http://disabilityemployment.org.au
/file/494af7ce8d9ced3f55a68416be25be5c43a25e6b/improving-the-
employment-participation-of-people-with-disability-in-australia.pdf.
119. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, THE ECONOMICS OF PAID AND UNPAID LEAVE 8 (2014) (describing the
benefits of paid leave on overall public health including lowered infant mortal-
ity, and long-term effects like increased higher educational attainment, higher
IQ scores, and higher earnings in adulthood for children whose mothers had
taken maternity leave),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20140627075322/https://www.whitehouse.gov/site
s/default/files/docs/leave_report_final.pdf].
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ration in the Earths climate probably requires significant eco-
nomic sacrifices.120 Justifying these sacrifices is not trivial be-
cause the benefits associated with them would mostly be felt by
future generations, and may be difficult to evaluate in mone-
tary terms because they involve non-market goods (e.g., pre-
venting the loss of certain species, such as polar bears).121 Mak-
ing policy choices in cases that involve such multi-dimensional
tradeoffs is extremely difficult.122 In many cases these trade-
offs involve incommensurable values. How much economic ef-
fort should be invested in preserving polar bears? What is the
economic value of the continued existence of small island na-
tions threatened with partial or virtually-total inundation by
future rises in sea level?123
The reluctance of Rio+20 to confront the tension between
green growth and conventional economic growth and the diffi-
cult tradeoffs underlying it124 reflects a more general lack of
120. See, e.g., Joeri Rogelj et al., Probabilistic Cost Estimates for Climate
Change Mitigation, 493 NATURE 79, 79, 82 (2013) (indicating total mitigation
costs in the range of 0.81.3% of gross world product, just to achieve a 66%
probability of limiting global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius by the
year 2100).
121. See Hallegatte et al., supra note 5, at 22 (noting the cost of delaying
action to cope with climate change); Péter K. Molnár et al., Predicting Surviv-
al, Reproduction and Abundance of Polar Bears Under Climate Change, 143
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1612, 1612 (2010) (noting that polar bear popula-
tions are predicted to be negatively affected by global warming).
122. See S. Stoll-Kleemann et al., The Psychology of Denial Concerning
Climate Mitigation Measures: Evidence from Swiss Focus Groups, 11 GLOBAL
ENVTL. CHANGE 107, 115 (2001) (The findings from this study reveal both a
coherence and a rationality to dissonance and denial that will not make it easy
for democracies to gain early consent for tough climate change mitigation
measures.); see also Gregory S. Berns et al., Intertemporal Choice  Toward
an Integrative Framework, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 482, 482 (2007); Mark
Sagoff, The Quantification and Valuation of Ecosystem Services, 70 ECOLOGI-
CAL ECON. 497, 500 (2011); Alexa Spence et al., The Psychological Distance of
Climate Change, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 957, 957 (2012); Nicholas Stern, Ethics,
Equity and the Economics of Climate Change Paper 2: Economics and Politics,
30 ECON. & PHIL. 445 (2014).
123. Among the most vulnerable of these island states are the Marshall
Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Cook Islands (in the Pacific Ocean); Antigua and Nevis (in the Caribbean Sea);
and the Maldives (in the Indian Ocean). See Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change [IPCC], Working Group II, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Ad-
aptation, and Vulnerability 935 (2001), http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports
/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=671.
124. For a more detailed discussion of this tension, see Hallegatte et al.,
supra note 5, at 19.
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political will to implement policies that could support (true)
green growth. Indeed, the conference ended without an agree-
ment on new global mechanisms that could facilitate the reali-
zation of the green economy vision. It failed to create new fi-
nancial mechanisms for long-term funding of sustainable
development, and was unable to agree on the much-needed
transformation of UNEP into a specialized U.N. Agency.125
Greenpeace described the conference as a failure of epic pro-
portions that will go down in history as Greenwash+20.126
Prof. Tim Jackson argued that the failure of Rio+20 is most viv-
idly reflected in the use of the phrase sustained economic
growth instead of the concept of sustainable growth: The G
word is a signifier for not changing the system. It is synony-
mous with western consumerism which we are locked into.
Green growth is the emperors new clothes, it is an empty con-
cept.127
One of the problems that governments are facing when
they consider whether to introduce meaningful green economy
measures is that the conventional indicator of economic growth,
increase in real gross domestic product (GDP),128 does not
measure overall welfare and therefore fails to capture many of
125. See Barbier, supra note 5, at 888 (noting the importance of a proposal
that was not adopted but would have transformed UNEP into a full-fledged
specialized UN agency capable of generating binding negotiated agreements
and principles among members a status held by similar U.N. agencies like
the International Labor Organization (ILO) and World Health Organization
(WHO)); see also Barbier, supra note 115 (writing prior to the conference about
the paramount importance and difficulty of agreeing on financing).
126. Press Release, Greenpeace Intl, Greenpeace Press Statement: Rio+20
Earth Summit  A Failure of Epic Proportions (June 22, 2012),
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/Greenpeace-Press-
Statement-Rio20-Earth-Summit-a-failure-of-epic-proportions/; see also WWF
Rio+20 Closing Statement, WWF GLOBAL (June 21, 2012),
http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?205343 (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). See gener-
ally Harriet Bulkeley et al., Governing Sustainability: Rio +20 and the Road
Beyond, 31 ENVT & PLANNING C 958 (2013).
127. See Jo Confino, Rio+20: Tim Jackson on How Fear Led World Leaders
to Betray Green Economy, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2012),
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/rio-20-tim-jackson-leaders-
green-economy.
128. Measuring Economic Growth, BANK OF CAN.,
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/core-functions/monetary-policy/measuring-
economic-growth/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) (describing methods of measuring
GDP). See, e.g., IMF, Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven, World Economic
Outlook (Apr. 2014) (measuring global economic growth in GDP).
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the benefits associated with pro-sustainability actions.129 For
example, the GDP does not include depreciation of capital
stocks used up in production.130 Furthermore, GDP has no deb-
it side that takes into account the negative externalities of cur-
rent production, such as the environmental costs of pollution.131
GDP interprets every expense as positive, even if it is associat-
ed with an activity that reduces welfare. For example, the costs
associated with the clean-up and remediation of oil spills in-
creases GDP, but the environmental damage does not enter
into the calculation of GDP, although it clearly detracts from
overall well-being.132 Likewise, market values of life better-
ment services and activities, such as housework, volunteer
work, ecosystem services, and leisure time are not measured by
GDP.133 This means that pro-sustainability action by govern-
ments could lower the GDP of the country, with potentially ad-
verse consequences such as lowering its credit rating,134 even if
in practice such action increases the overall welfare of citizens.
Critics of GDP have developed alternative measures, such
as the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), the
Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), the Sustainable Net Benefit
Index (SNBI), and the Gross National Happiness developed in
Bhutan.135 These indicators offer better measurement of
129. See Kenneth J. Bagstad et al., Methodological Developments in US
State-Level Genuine Progress Indicators: Toward GPI 2.0, 45 ECOLOGICAL
INDICATORS 474, 475 (2014); Ida Kubiszewski et al., Beyond GDP: Measuring
and Achieving Global Genuine Progress, 93 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 57, 57 (2013);
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASURE-
MENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 7780, 23941
(2009), http://www.insee.fr/fr/publications-et-services/dossiers_web/stiglitz
/docommission/RAPPORT_anglais.pdf.
130. Tim Callen, Gross Domestic Product, INTL MONETARY FUND (Mar. 28,
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm (noting that
GDP does not include depletion of capital stock used to produce output).
131. Id. (noting that GDP does not measure overall well-being and does not
count externalities of increased production, which could lead to an overall net
reduction in individual well-being because increased output may come at the
cost of environmental damage or other external costs).
132. Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, Abolishing GDP 89 (Feb. 2007) (un-
published article), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962343.
133. Id. at 78.
134. See António Afonso et al., Short- and Long-Run Determinants of Sov-
ereign Debt Credit Ratings, 16 INTL J. FIN. & ECON. 1, 1 (2011).
135. See van den Bergh, supra note 132, at 1216; Bhutan GNH Index,
GNH INDEX, http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/articles/ (last visited Oct.
9, 2015).
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changes in welfare, correcting important deficiencies of conven-
tional GDP by adding or subtracting certain partially calculat-
ed amounts of money to or from GDP.136 By incorporating pro-
cesses that are not evaluated by the market, such as inequality
or environmental degradation, these indexes seek to provide
better estimates of economic welfare.137 Some studies have
shown that at the global level, despite the steady increase in
global GDP/capita, which in some countries (such as China and
India) has been dramatic, GPI has decreased.138 This shows
that although GDP growth is increasing benefits, these are
outweighed by rising inequality of income and an increase in
environmental costs.139 Despite the growing literature discuss-
ing these alternative measures, however, the conventional GDP
measure continues to dominate current economic discourse.
IV. SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES: SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY
The field of sustainability indexes provides an interesting
case study for exploring the limits of the green economy thesis
because they attempt to promote sustainability thinking from
within the heart of global capitalismthe stock exchange. Like
the alternative measures to GDP discussed above, sustainabil-
ity indexes reflect an attempt to develop more complex
measures of firms performance, which could reflect not only
their financial performance but also their sustainability efforts.
In this way, sustainability indexes seek to encourage firms to
consider their business strategies from a broader perspective.
But, as I argue below, there are several key flaws in the way in
which sustainability indexes are structured, which could un-
dermine this effort.
Two key questions arise in the study of sustainability in-
dexes. The first concerns their capacity to act as instruments of
social steering; the second concerns their strategies of legitima-
tion. The latter question arises because the potential effect of
sustainability indexes on the behavior of firms turns the index-
es into regulatory players, with powers comparable to those of
136. See Bagstad et al., supra note 129, at 475; Kubiszewski et al., supra
note 129, at 57; van den Bergh, supra note 132, at 1216.
137. See van den Bergh, supra note 132, at 1216.
138. Kubiszewski et al., supra note 129.
139. See, e.g., id. at 67.
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public institutions such as the UNEP Finance Initiative.140 The
two questions are critical for understanding the capacity of sus-
tainability indexes to contribute to the realization of the green
economy vision. The following sections explore these questions
from theoretical and empirical perspectives, focusing on the
differences between FTSE4Good and DJSIthe two major
global players141based on a close analysis of their supporting
documents and on an extensive literature review.
DJSI draws on the expertise of a leading global environ-
mental research agency: the SAM Group; FTSE has recently
ended its long-term relationship with the UK-based agency
Eiris, and started to perform the ESG assessment in-house.142
The Dow Jones and FTSE indexes both focus on positive crite-
ria for selecting companies,143 but have developed different se-
140. See About, U.N. ENVT PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE,
http://www.unepfi.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
141. For some other noteworthy social-environmental indexes, see ESG
Indexes, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/esg-indexes (last visited Oct. 10, 2015);
Indices Euronext Vigeo, VIGEO, http://www.vigeo.com/csr-rating-
agency/en/actualites-a-presse/blog-9 (last visited Oct. 10, 2015); Jantzi Social
Index, SUSTAINALYTICS, http://www.sustainalytics.com/JSI (last visited Oct.
10, 2015). Other related players are ranking initiatives, see, for example, 100
Best Corporate Citizens, CORP. RESP. MAG., Mar.Apr. 2015, at 10,
http://www.thecro.com/files/100%20Best%20List%202015.pdf; CK Staff, The
Global 100 Most Sustainable Corporations, CORP. KNIGHTS (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://www.corporateknights.com/magazines/2015-global-100-issue/2015-
global-100-results-14218559/; CR Index 2015, THE PRINCES RESP. BUS. NET-
WORK, http://www.bitc.org.uk/system/files/7771_cr_index_0.pdf (last visited
Oct. 10, 2015). The fact that the FTSE4Good and DJSI indexes are not merely
ranking exercises but also act as a central source of information for financial
decisions makes them more influential. Furthermore, they are embedded in
much more developed institutional structures than other indexes.
142. FTSE4Good Ends 12-year Relationship with Eiris, CORPORATEREGIS-
TER, http://www.corporateregister.com/news/item/?n=534 (last visited Oct. 10,
2015); see EIRIS, http://www.eiris.org/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2015); Sustainabil-
ity Investing, ROBECOSAM, http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/sustainability-assessment/sustainability-investing.jsp (last visited
Oct. 10 2015). FTSE4Good has introduced some revisions to its ESG assess-
ment process in 2014, which will be reviewed later.
143. FTSE uses some built-in exclusion criteria, whereas DJSI, which does
not rely on negative screening in its general indexes, offers some exclusion
indexes. E.g., Dow Jones Sustainability World Enlarged Index ex Alcohol, To-
bacco, Gambling, Armaments & Firearms and Adult Entertainment Fact
Sheet, S&P DOW JONES INDICES (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/fact_info/Dow_Jones_Sustainabil
ity_World_Enlarged_Index_ex_Alcohol_Tobacco_Gambling_Armaments_and_
Firearms_and_Adult_Entertainment_Fact_Sheet.pdf. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the selection methodologies of both index families, see FTSE, INDEX
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lection approaches.144 DJSI tracks the financial performance of
the leading sustainability-driven companies worldwide, and
includes companies in its various indexes based on a best-in-
class criterion, which picks out the best performers within
each industrial sub-sector.145 Each DJSI benchmark index has
a different target number. For example, the Dow Jones Sus-
tainability World Index (DJSI World) includes the top 10% of
the leading sustainability companies out of the largest 2,500
companies in the S&P Global BMI, whereas DJSI Europe in-
cludes the top 20% of companies among the 600 largest devel-
oped European companies listed in the S&P Global BMI.146
Since the launch of DJSI World, in 1999, other indexes have
been added to the series.147 The FTSE4Good Index Series,
which was launched in July 2001, is based on a similar vision:
to measure the performance of companies demonstrating
strong Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) practic-
es.148 But, unlike the DJSI series, the FTSE4Good series is
based on a principle of eligibility (an absolute threshold ap-
proach), so that [a]ll companies in each constituent Universe
index that pass the eligibility criteria detailed in the
FTSE4Good Index Inclusion Rules at the review date are in-
cluded in the relevant FTSE4Good Benchmark Index.149
INCLUSION RULES FOR THE FTSE4GOOD INDEX SERIES (version 1.6, June
2015) [hereinafter FTSE4GOOD INDEX INCLUSION RULES],
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151029122349/http://www.ftse.com/products/do
wnloads/F4G-Index-Inclusion-Rules.pdf]; S&P DOW JONES INDICES, DOW
JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDICES METHODOLOGY (Oct. 2015) [hereinafter DJSI
METHODOLOGY],
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151117035807/http://www.djindexes.com/mdsid
x/downloads/meth_info/methodology-dj-sustainability-indices.pdf].
144. For a detailed evaluation of the selection criteria developed by DJSI
and FTSE4Good and other ranking schemes, see Cory Searcy, Corporate Sus-
tainability Performance Measurement Systems: A Review and Research Agen-
da, 107 J. BUS. ETHICS 239, 24750 (2012); Cory Searcy & Doaa Elkhawas,
Corporate Sustainability Ratings: An Investigation into How Corporations Use
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, 35 J. CLEANER PROD. 79, 90 (2012); Elena
Escrig-Olmedo et al., Lights and Shadows on Sustainability Rating Scoring, 8
REV. MANAGERIAL SCI. 559, 55974 (2014); Wendy Stubbs & Paul Rogers,
Lifting the Veil on Environment-Social-Governance Rating Methods, 9 SOC.
RESP. J. 622, 62240 (2013).
145. DJSI METHODOLOGY, supra note 143, at 3.
146. Id. at 8, 10.
147. See id. at 1718. For the full list see, DJSI Family Overview, supra
note 29.
148. FTSE4GOOD INDEX INCLUSION RULES, supra note 143, § 1.1.
149. FTSE4GOOD GROUND RULES, supra note 34, § 5.3.2.
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A. SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES AS INSTRUMENTS OF SOCIAL
STEERING
There are several potential paths by which sustainability
indexes can influence corporate behavior and society as a
whole. First, firms may be impelled to improve their behavior
owing to reputational concerns associated with the potential
negative or positive repercussions of being excluded or included
in the index.150 This effect was demonstrated, for example, with
regard to ranking schemes in other fields, such as the influen-
tial U.S. News & World Report ranking of law schools.151 Se-
cond, sustainability indexes may exercise a more subtle impact
by creating a widespread evaluation matrix that permeates
throughout the firm and corporate order, and has an effect ir-
respective of actual instrumental calculations. Scholars exam-
ining the influence of ranking schemes, have found rankings
can affect the internal routines and cognitive structures of the
measured organization, leading to changes in organizational
self-perceptions. The rankings create continuous processes of
observation, measurement, and evaluation, which can generate
reflexive processes of institutional change, as the organizations
adapt and develop anticipatory, self-disciplinary structures
based on the evaluative metrics.152 The way in which both
FTSE4Good and DJSI engage with the firms participating in
the index evaluation process supports this hypothesis.
A third route of influence is in the effect sustainability in-
dexes have on the broader market for Socially Responsible In-
vestment (SRI). The methodologies used by DJSI and
FTSE4Good for selecting and ranking companies could become
150. See Chatterji & Toffel, supra note 102, at 918.
151. Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity:
How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds, 113 AM. J. SOC. 33 (2007) (using
media rankings of law schools to explore how the methodological concept in
sociology of reactivitythe idea that people change their behavior in reaction
to being evaluated, observed, or measured can be a helpful model for un-
derstanding how ratings change firm behavior); see Michael Bastedo & Nicho-
las Bowman, U.S. News & World Report College Rankings: Modeling Institu-
tional Effects on Organizational Reputation, 116 AM. J. EDUC. 163, 163 (2010);
Michael Sauder & Ryon Lancaster, Do Rankings Matter? The Effects of U.S.
News & World Report Rankings on the Admissions Process of Law Schools, 40
L. & SOCY REV. 105, 105 (2006).
152. Espeland & Sauder, supra note 151; Wendy Nelson Espeland &
Mitchell L. Stevens, A Sociology of Quantification, 49 EUR. J. SOC. 401, 416
(2008).
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a type of normative benchmark for the SRI market as a
whole.153 Through their influence on ethical investors, sustain-
ability indexes may have a further effect on firms by indirectly
influencing their cost of capital.154 Finally, the normative
benchmarks developed by the indexes can influence the the-
matic horizon of CSR discourse as a whole.155
The foregoing hypotheses have some empirical support in
the literature.156 A questionnaire-based survey conducted in
May 2004 explored the FTSE4Good indexs effect on corporate
behavior of companies listed on the FTSE4Good UK and Eu-
rope indexes.157 The study found that the FTSE4Good initiative
had some influence on the companies internal dynamics, espe-
cially reporting and management procedures.158 A study of the
KLD Indexes by Chatterji and Toffel examined the reputational
effect of index rating (isolating a similar dynamic as Potoski
and Prakashs green club model159), and argued that poor rat-
153. A related area of research interrogates the considerations that may
lead individuals to invest in ethical funds. Eva Hofmann et al., A Comparison
of Models Describing the Impact of Moral Decision Making on Investment De-
cisions, 82 J. BUS. ETHICS 171, 173 (2008); Eva Hofmann et al., The Decision
Process for Ethical Investment, 12 J. FIN. SERV. MKT. 4, 5 (2007).
154. Whether the SRI market has an influence on the cost of capital of
sustainable companies is a debatable issue. See Geoffrey M. Heal, Corporate
Social Responsibility  An Economic and Financial Framework, 30 GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INSUR. 387, 39798 (2005) (noting that [i]f significant
sums of money are invested preferentially in companies with good CSR rec-
ords, their cost of capital will fall, but that there is little evidence this is oc-
curring); Darren D. Lee & Robert W. Faff, Corporate Sustainability
Performance and Idiosyncratic Risk: A Global Perspective, 44 FIN. REV. 213,
215 (2009) (aruging that lagging returns by firms with high social
performance is incorporated into investor willingness to pay price premiums
for firms with lower expected risk, and concluding that one of the main
benefits of having a leading CSP profile is that a firm is able to reduce its
business risk relative to lagging CSP firms and secure a lower cost of equity
capital).
155. A good example for this phenomenon is inclusion of new climate
change criteria among the FTSE4Good criteria in 2007. See FTSE Group In-
troduces New Climate Change Criteria to its FTSE4Good Series, CSRWIRE
(Feb. 7, 2007, 3:00 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/17420-FTSE-
Group-Introduces-New-Climate-Change-Criteria-to-its-FTSE4Good-Series.
156. Although, as I argue in the next section, there are some basic prob-
lems in the structure of these indexes that can significantly weaken their ca-
pacity to achieve far-reaching pro-sustainability changes in firms behavior.
157. GEORGE COBB ET AL., FTSE4GOOD: PERCEPTIONS AND PERFORMANCE
3549 (2005).
158. Id. at 5.
159. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 83, at 7879.
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ings shame firms and threaten their legitimacy.160 These poorly
rated firms would be particularly likely to respond in ways that
improve their ranking, causing managers to implement prac-
tices aimed at improving their firms standing with the inde-
pendent rating agencies.161 They further suggest that the
subset of poorly rated firms that face lower-cost improvement
opportunities . . . [are] especially likely to make the invest-
ments needed to improve their ratings.162 They found that
firms with lower starting KLD ratings improved their envi-
ronmental performance more than firms with initially higher
ratings, and that this trend was more pronounced in highly
regulated industries and among firms where there were more
low-cost opportunities to improve.163
Both FTSE4Good and DJSI have engagement programs
with firms that are based on continuous dialogue and have
seemingly positive outcomes. In a recent report summarizing
the first ten years of the index, FTSE emphasized the efficacy
of its engagement program, which is [o]verseen by an inde-
pendent, expert Policy Committee and supported by an evolv-
ing criteria platform and direct company engagement pro-
gramme, FTSE4Good has made a significant and measurable
impact on the behaviour of companies.164 A recent study by
Mackenzie, Rees, and Rodionova provides tentative empirical
corroboration of this claim.165 The authors used a natural ex-
periment provided by the FTSE4Good upgrade of their envi-
ronmental management criteria in 2002, when they engaged
with index member firms that would not meet the new re-
quirements, but did not engage with non-member firms that
would similarly fail.166 By 2005, 49% of the 377 large and in-
ternationally diverse firms that had received engagement and
been threatened with exclusion from the FTSE4Good index had
complied, as opposed to 24% of the 652 firms that were not sub-
ject to engagement or potential exclusion.167 This result is sta-
tistically significant even after controlling for some environ-
160. Chatterji & Toffel, supra note 102, at 918.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 92022.
164. FTSE, FTSE4GOOD: 10 YEARS OF IMPACT & INVESTMENT 9 (2011),
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE4Good_10_Year_Report.pdf.
165. Mackenzie et al., supra note 103, at 50910.
166. Id. at 500.
167. Id. at 500 fig.2.
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mental risk, industry, country, governance, and financial per-
formance.168 Further results indicate that the effect of FTSE
engagement produces a difference in compliance that persists
for at least five years.169 These results are consistent with the
claim that the engagement process undertaken by FTSE, cou-
pled with the threat of being excluded from the FTSE4Good
index, is efficient in causing firms to comply with FTSE evalua-
tion criteria.170
In their 2010 yearbook, SAM offered a similar assessment
of the DJSI company engagement program.171 In the DJSI en-
gagement process, SAM sends each firm an annual company-
specific benchmarking report that allows firms to see how they
compare to their peers, often triggering a dialogue with
SAM.172 From 2001 to 2009, an average of 70% of participating
firms improved their total scores.173 This claim received indi-
rect support from evidence of the value of being listed in sus-
tainable indexes as far as reputation and market value are con-
cerned, which indicates that firms have strategic reasons to
take this engagement process seriously (and the implicit threat
of being deleted from the index).174
168. Id. at 50407.
169. Id. at 507.
170. Id. at 509.
171. SAM & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SUSTAINABILITY YEARBOOK
2010 (2010), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/sustainability/assets/sustainability-
yearbook-2010.pdf.
172. Id. at 20.
173. Id. at 21; accord Chatterji & Toffel, supra note 102, at 918 (finding
that firms improve performance due to ratings). However, as I have noted in
earlier work, Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 572 n.113, other
authors have failed to find that CSR rating and reporting has an influence on
firm behavior. Steven Scalet & Thomas F. Kelly, CSR Rating Agencies: What
is Their Global Impact?, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 69, 77 (2009). Scalet and Kelly
presented an empirical study of CSR rating agencies (Innovest and CRO Mag-
azine). Contrary to Chatterji and Toffel, they found that being dropped from a
CSR ranking appears to do little to encourage firms to acknowledge and ad-
dress problems related to their social and environmental performance. Id. But
the authors noted that their methodology cannot capture all the possible ef-
fects of ranking institutions, and considered their study primarily as an ex-
ploratory exercise. Id. For a skeptical view of the efficacy of DJSI in improving
corporate environmental performance, see Charles H. Cho et al., Do Actions
Speak Louder than Words? An Empirical Investigation of Corporate
Environmental Reputation, 37 ACCT. ORG. & SOCY 14, 23 (2012).
174. Michael Robinson et al., Signaling Sustainability Leadership: Empiri-
cal Evidence of the Value of DJSI Membership, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 493, 503
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But do sustainability indexes also have an influence on the
structure of the SRI market? Authors like Fowler and Hope
have examined this question by looking at total investment
funds managed using sustainability indexes.175 From this ap-
proach, the authors concluded that, as of 2003, the effect of sus-
tainability indexes had been limited.176 The methodology used
by Fowler and Hope focuses on funds tracking the indexes, but
does not necessarily capture some broader effects of the index-
es, which also likely have indirect influence on the methodolo-
gies and choices of individual investment agents.177 Other au-
thors like Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel have generally assumed
that environmental ratings would have a meaningful influence
within the SRI market,178 but relied mostly on only anecdotal
evidence to support this claim.179 However, their study mainly
focused on slightly separate question: whether sustainability
ratings (focusing on the KLD index) can help investors and
stakeholders identify which companies are truly environmen-
tally responsible.180 As of the end of March 2015, DJSI reports
that ten billion dollars in assets are invested based on the DJSI
index family, and that other investors rely on the indexes in
designing their ethical investment strategy.181
04 (2011); see Isabel Costa Lourenço et al., The Value Relevance of Reputation
for Sustainability Leadership, 119 J. BUS. ETHICS 17, 25 (2014).
175. Stephen J. Fowler & C. Hope, A Critical Review of Sustainable Busi-
ness Indices and Their Impact, 76 J. BUS. ETHICS 243, 249 (2007).
176. Id. at 24950. As I have noted in earlier work, Perez, Ensemble Regu-
lation, supra note 45, at 572 n.112, they found that as of December 2003,
$2.94 billion dollars were managed by funds tracking the DJSI index, with
less than that amount using the FTSE4Good. Fowler & Hope, supra note 175,
at 24950. This is a relatively small figure given that total funds under man-
agement in the U.S. alone were $19.2 trillion at the time. Id. at 250. Since this
paper was published, the number of index-based financial products has in-
creased significantly, and as of the end of March 2015 the assets managed
under DJSI indexes totaled approximately $10 billion dollars. RobecoSAM
Indices, ROBECOSAM, http://www.sustainability-indices.com/about-
us/robecosam-indices.jsp (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
177. Fowler & Hope, supra note 175, at 251.
178. Aaron K. Chatterji et al., How Well Do Social Ratings Actually
Measure Corporate Social Responsibility?, 18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY
125, 12632 (2009).
179. Id. at 12627 (noting that TIAA-CREF sold $50 million dollars of Co-
ca-Cola Co. stock after KLD dropped the company from its Broad Market So-
cial Index).
180. Id. at 127, 165.
181. RobecoSAM Indices, supra note 176; SAM & PRICEWATERHOUSE-
COOPERS, supra note 171, at 22.
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B. THE LIMITS OF FTSE4GOOD AND DJSI: THE SUSTAINABILITY-
PECUNIARY PARADOX AND THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT PROBLEM
The evidence described in the previous section provides
tentative support for the argument that sustainability indexes
have some steering capacity, although current research does
not provide a clear picture of the extent and scope of their pro-
sustainability impact. I argue, however, that we have good rea-
sons to doubt the extent to which FTSE4Good and DJSI can
have significant, game-changing effects on firms CSR perfor-
mance, because of two key structural features of these indexes.
First, as I elaborate below, the intermixing of continuous finan-
cial monitoring and ordinal sustainability ranking can under-
mine the capacity of the indexes to change corporate behavior.
Second, the governance structure of the indexes does not pro-
vide sufficient participatory opportunities for civic players. This
democratic deficit could give corporations undue influence over
the way in which the indexes function.
1. The Tension Generated by Intermixing Financial Tracking
and Sustainability Ranking
The way in which FTSE4Good and DJSI combine financial
monitoring and sustainability ranking generates a problematic
mismatch. The indexes present themselves as being driven by a
logic of sustainability, reflected in the criteria through which
they evaluate firms.182 But once their composition is deter-
mined through that very logic, they are marketed as financial
instruments that track the value of the shares of listed firms.183
The indexes do not provide quantified data on the sustainabil-
ity performance of listed firms after they join the club.184 The
182. See supra notes 14349 and accompanying text.
183. DJSI Family Overview, supra note 29 (The family tracks the stock
performance of the worlds leading companies.); FTSE4Good Index Series
Factsheet, FTSE (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.ftse.com/Analytics/FactSheets/Home/DownloadSingleIssue?openfil
e=open&issueName=4GL1 (The indexes are calculated based on price and
total return methodologies, both real time and end-of-day.).
184. ROBECOSAM, CSA METHODOLOGY, supra note 55, at 2122 (noting
that CSA scores are only used in-house for RobecoSAM and parent Robecos
asset management offering[s] and sustainability benchmarking activities,
and other internal product and analysis uses). FTSE does some limited release
of their company specific sustainability ratings for investors or analysts that
license the sustainability ratings for use in constructing their own actively
managed funds or investment analysis. FTSE ESG Ratings, supra note 32.
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result is problematic because sustainability-conscious firms are
being judged, even within the institutional framework of sus-
tainability indexes, according to their financial success rather
than sustainability scores.
The intermixing of ordinal sustainability ranking (which is
being determined in yearly intervals185) and quantitative
measurement of financial performance (determined on a daily
basis186) can undermine the capacity of these indexes to facili-
tate pro-sustainability changes. First, the fact that firms are
being continuously monitored with respect to their share values
(financial performance), but not with respect to their sustaina-
bility performance, conveys the message that financial perfor-
mance continues to be more valuable even within the green set-
ting of sustainability indexes. Such interpretation is reinforced
by the institutional emphasis sustainability indexes place on
the financial performance of the indexes, as discussed below.
This interpretative result is inconsistent with the indexes at-
tempt to present themselves as champions of sustainability.
Second, the asymmetric reporting structure of the indexes
can facilitate greenwash behavior. Whereas listed firms can
present themselves as sustainable because of the ordinal-
binary nature of the indexes ranking procedure, the indexes do
not provide the necessary data that could allow external ob-
servers to scrutinize the sustainability performance of the
firms (or, consequently, the indexes aggregate sustainability
performance).187 Finally, this informational asymmetry also
prevents a much-needed discussion on the trade-offs associated
with a shift to a green economy regime because it does not al-
low external observers to compare firms sustainability
achievements (e.g., cuts in carbon emissions) against related
economic sacrifices (e.g., increased operational costs due to the
use of green energy).
Below I illustrate this asymmetric reporting structure
more vividly. The primary measure of sustainability perfor-
mance provided by the indexes is of an ordinal-binary nature: a
firm is either part of the index or it is not.188 Recently both in-
185. DJSI METHODOLOGY, supra note 143, at 14.
186. Id. at 19.
187. Cf. Cho et al., supra note 173, at 1924 (finding that actual environ-
mental performance correlated negatively with being listed in DJSI).
188. For example, the DJSI annual review highlights the largest ten addi-
tions and deletions to and from the DJSI World Index. See ROBECOSAM, DJSI
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dexes have created an additional layer of excellence, which they
call sustainability leaders (which is again structured as an
ordinal-binary measure).189 The DJSI publishes a list of Indus-
try Group Leaders in each of the twenty-four industrial sectors
represented in the DJSI World Index,190 and FTSE has created
a unique index, the FTSE4Good Environmental Leaders Eu-
rope 40 Index, which is based on a similar logic and seeks to
identify European companies with leading environmental prac-
tices.191
Table 1 shows the list of DJSI Industry Group Leaders as
of September 2015.
Table 1: List of DJSI Industry Group Leaders
(September 2015)192
Name Industry Group Country
Bayerische Motoren Werke
AG
Automobiles & Compo-
nents
Germany
Westpac Banking Corp Banks Australia
2015 REVIEW RESULTS 11 (2015),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160110200848/http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/images/review-presentation-2015.pdf]. The ten largest additions
in 2015 include: Bank of America Corp., Telefonica SA, BHP Billiton Ltd.,
Deutsche Telekom AG, Societe Generale SA, BHP Billiton PLC, Mitsubishi
Corp., Vinci SA, GDF Suez, Nomura Holdings Inc. The ten largest deletions in
2015: Cisco Systems Inc., PepsiCo Inc., Royal Bank of Canada, Diageo PLC,
ABB Ltd., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Air Products & Chemicals
Inc., Waste Management Inc., Henkel AG & Co. KGaA, Experian PLC. Id.
189. DJSI METHODOLOGY, supra note 143.
190. See Industry Group Leaders 2015, ROBECOSAM (Sept. 2015),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151009130025/http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/review/industry-group-leaders-2015.jsp]. Between 2014 and 2015,
the industry leaders in sixteen of these twenty-four sectors remained the
same, see Industry Group Leaders 2014, ROBECOSAM (Sept. 2014),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20141008151616/http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/review/industry-group-leaders-2014.jsp].
191. The index is constructed by including all European companies in the
FTSE4Good Index Series that have obtained the best practice environmental
rating of at least four (out of five), ranking them by full market capitalization,
and then selecting the top 40. FTSE4Good Environmental Leaders Europe 40
Index Factsheet, FTSE (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://www.ftse.com/Analytics/FactSheets/Home/DownloadSingleIssue?issueN
ame=4ELE. See Appendix for a list of the Top 10 Constituents of the Europe
40 Index infra Table 2.
192. Industry Group Leaders 2015, supra note 190.
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CNH Industrial NV Capital Goods United Kingdom
SGS SA
Commercial & Profession-
al Services
Switzerland
LG Electronics Inc
Consumer Durables &
Apparel
Republic of Korea
Sodexo Consumer Services France
UBS Group AG Diversified Financials Switzerland
Thai Oil PCL Energy Thailand
METRO AG Food & Staples Retailing Germany
Unilever NV
Food, Beverage & Tobac-
co
Netherlands
Abbott Laboratories
Health Care Equipment &
Services
United States
Kao Corp
Household & Personal
Products
Japan
Swiss Re AG Insurance Switzerland
Akzo Nobel NV Materials Netherlands
Telenet Group Holding NV Media Belgium
Roche Holding AG
Pharmaceuticals, Biotech-
nology & Life Sciences
Switzerland
Stockland Real Estate Australia
Lotte Shopping Co Ltd Retailing Republic of Korea
Taiwan Semiconductor Man-
ufacturing Co Ltd
Semiconductors & Semi-
conductor Equipment
Taiwan
Fujitsu Ltd Software & Services Japan
Alcatel-Lucent
Technology Hardware &
Equipment
France
KT Corp
Telecommunication Ser-
vices
Republic of Korea
Air France-KLM Transportation France
Gas Natural SDG SA Utilities Spain
Although the ordinal rankings generated by the indexes
provide valuable information on firms commitment to sustain-
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ability, they do not provide any quantified, time-sensitive data
on the sustainability performance of the listed firmseven
those identified as leadersor of the sustainability perfor-
mance of the indexes as a whole.193 In contrast, both DJSI and
FTSE4Good provide detailed data about the financial perfor-
mance of each of the indexes included in their index-series by
tracking changes in share prices.194 This data is regularly com-
pared to the performance of non-sustainability indexes.195 For
example, the DJSI World Index quarterly presentations from
RobecoSAM are exclusively comprised of financial performance
and risk comparisons between the DJSI World Index and a
broad market index, the MSCI All Country Index.196 Factsheets
and information on specialized sustainability index products,
like the FTSE4Good Environmental Leaders Europe 40 Index,
likewise report only market performance and returns against
various benchmarks.197
The evaluative bias that is generated by the indexes
asymmetrical informational structure is also reflected in the
academic literature. Dozens of papers have examined the fi-
nancial performance of ethical financial instruments or of sus-
tainable indexes relative to conventional instruments or index-
es, and the financial performance of firms that are considered
more sustainable than comparable firms that are less sustain-
able.198 But, the informational structure of the indexes does not
193. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
194. DJSI Family Overview, supra note 29; FTSE4Good Index Series, su-
pra note 28.
195. See FTSE4Good Index Series Factsheet, supra note 183 (comparing to
various benchmarks); infra note 198 and accompanying text.
196. See ROBECOSAM, DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDICES (DJSI): JUNE
2015 (2015), [https://web.archive.org/web
/20151004203149/http://www.sustainability-indices.com/images/quarterly-djsi-
presentation-web.pdf]. For the MSCI All Country Index, see Market Cap In-
dexes, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/market-cap-weighted-indexes (last visited
Nov. 16, 2015).
197. See FTSE4Good Environmental Leaders Europe 40 Index Factsheet,
supra note 191.
198. E.g., Rob Bauer et al., The Ethical Mutual Fund Performance Debate:
New Evidence from Canada, 70 J. BUS. ETHICS 111, 11322 (2007) (comparing
Canadian ethical mutual funds to conventional mutual funds and a market
index); Yacine Belghitar et al., Does It Pay to Be Ethical? Evidence from the
FTSE4Good, 47 J. BANKING & FIN. 54, 5661 (2014) (comparing FTSE4Good
indexes to conventional and market indexes); Felipe Arias Fogliano de Souza
Cunha & Carlos Patricio Samanez, Performance Analysis of Sustainable In-
vestments in the Brazilian Stock Market: A Study About the Corporate Sus-
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allow observers to conduct a detailed evaluation of the sustain-
ability performance of listed firms (whether in isolation or vis-
à-vis non-listed firms). For such an analysis researchers must
turn to external sources.199
2. Critical Examination of FTSE4Good and DJSI Governance
Structure from a Democratic Perspective
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that both
FTSE4Good and DJSI possess significant regulatory powers;
they cannot be dismissed as mere exercises in cheap talk. How-
ever, this understanding raises a different question: how far
are these bodies committed to the precepts of democratic gov-
ernance, and are the legitimation mechanisms they have devel-
oped consistent with these precepts?200 The demand for democ-
ratization is based on normative and instrumental
justifications. From the perspective of democratic theory, the
fact that both FTSE4Good and DJSI hold semi-regulatory pow-
ers that can affect third parties creates a valid claim for the
tainability Index (ISE), 117 J. BUS. ETHICS 19, 2935 (2012) (comparing con-
ventional indexes to the Corporate Sustainability Index of the Brazilian Secu-
rities, Commodities and Futures Exchange); Renato J. Orsato et al., Sustaina-
bility Indexes: Why Join In? A Study of the Corporate Sustainability Index
(ISE) in Brazil, 96 J. CLEANER PROD. 161, 16568 (2015) (assessing sixteen
studies that compare conventional indexes to the Corporate Sustainability
Index of the Brazilian Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange); Miri-
am von Wallis & Christian Klein, Ethical Requirement and Financial Interest:
A Literature Review on Socially Responsible Investing, 8 BUS. RES. (forthcom-
ing 2015) (published online at 1129) (presenting a meta-analysis of fifty-three
studies comparing performance of SRI and conventional investments over the
period from 1986 to 2012); see also Heal, supra note 154, at 40002 (comparing
studies of SRI performance against conventional funds). The evidence on per-
formance compared to conventional instruments is mixed across these and
other studies, and I do not discuss it here.
199. Cf. Daniel Berliner & Aseem Prakash, The United Nations Global
Compact: An Institutionalist Perspective, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 217, 21921
(2014) (highlighting various information sources and proxies that have been
used to assess the effect of CSR regimes); Aseem Prakash, Responsible Care:
An Assessment, 39 BUS. & SOCY 183, 19798 (2000) (discussing difficulties in
testing and verifying sustainability performance from one CSR regime).
200. More generally, on the questions of democracy and legitimacy at the
transnational level, see Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal
Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25, 37 (2003); Judith G. Kelley & Beth A.
Simmons, The Power of Performance Indicators: Rankings, Ratings and
Reactivity in International Relations 1720 (2014) (unpublished article),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2451319.
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justification of these powers. One type of justification advocated
by democratic theory is to subject the exercise of authority to
deliberative scrutiny that would reflect the views of the com-
munity influenced by the authority in question.201 This claim
also reflects the current understanding of sustainability as in-
corporating a commitment to participatory values. For exam-
ple, Agenda 21, a key international document on sustainability,
emphasizes in various places the value of democratic process-
es.202 Similarly, the academic literature on sustainable devel-
opment has referred to democracy or governance as the
fourth pillar of sustainability.203 Epistemic justification of a
power to regulate based, for example, on the expertise of the
regulatory body is usually not considered sufficient.204 This
democratic expectation does not rely on instrumental consider-
ations; it holds even if the projected deliberative process does
not yield tangible benefits (e.g., improvement in the quality of
regulatory standards).
The argument for democratization can also be cast in in-
strumental fashion. Here the claim is that the absence of dem-
ocratic processes can adversely affect the capability of the in-
dexes to promote pro-sustainability changes. This potentially
negative effect is due, first, to the fact that a governance struc-
ture that does not grant sufficient representation to civic voices
may give corporations disproportionate influence over the op-
eration of the indexes, thereby weakening their sustainability
201. See Perez, supra note 200, at 29 (The broadening acceptance of the
democratic ideal in contemporary (global) society means that the legitimacy of
transnational regimes is judged, increasingly, by the nature of the process
that led to the regimes creation . . . . This tendency reflects a widely-shared
expectation that the people affected by a certain normative structure should
be involved in its design and implementation. (footnote omitted)).
202. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, ¶¶
1.3, 2.6, 3.2, 3.7, 5.12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. IIII) (Aug. 12, 1992);
accord EARTH CHARTER INTL, THE EARTH CHARTER, at princs. 3, 13 (2012),
http://www.earthcharterinaction.org/invent/images/uploads/echarter_english.p
df.
203. See Tom Waas et al., Sustainable Development: A Birds Eye View, 3
SUSTAINABILITY 1637, 1651 (2011).
204. See Oren Perez, The Hybrid Legal-Scientific Dynamic of Transnation-
al Scientific Institutions, 26 EUR. J. INTL L. 391, 397 (2014) (Legal authority
cannot transform epistemic claims into truths . . . . [And] epistemic authority
cannot produce binding prescriptions.).
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bite.205 Such corporate influence may be reflected both in the
design of the inclusion criteria and in their implementation
(e.g., in the engagement process and decisions about de-
listing).206 Second, in the long term, the democratic deficit in
the indexes structure can undermine their public legitimacy
and ultimately the value of their brand to listed firms and their
overall efficacy.207
Below I expose in detail the extent of this democratic defi-
cit in both organizations. In particular, I will argue that alt-
hough DJSI and FTSE4Good have made some effort to open up
their decision making process,208 the level of transparency of
both schemes and the opportunities they provide for civic par-
ticipation fall short of what should be expected from organiza-
tions with semi-regulatory powers.209 Further, I will argue that
in the past four years both DJSI and FTSE4Good seem to have
downscaled their commitment to democratic values.210
205. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 199, at 184, 19798 (noting intense dis-
trust from critics of a CSR regime designed and controlled by an industry as-
sociation and its members).
206. See, e.g., id.
207. See, e.g., id. (noting an industry associations inability to get buy-in
from firms to improve the CSR regime after public criticism).
208. Other transnational regulatory institutions have been engaged with
similar efforts. See, e.g., Adi Ayal et al., Science, Politics and Transnational
Regulation: Regulatory Scientific Institutions and the Dilemmas of Hybrid
Authority, 2 TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL. L. 45, 61 (2013) (ICNIRP has also estab-
lished an open review process on its guidelines. Since 2009, it has been sub-
jecting all of its exposure guidelines to an open consultation process prior to
publication.); Bernstein & Cashore, supra note 30, at 353 (noting improve-
ments to incorporate democratic principles in organizations like UNEP, the
World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility, the Marine Stewardship
Council, and the Forest Stewardship Council).
209. Another legitimation strategy used by DJSI and FTSE4Good to im-
prove their legitimacy is based on an epistemological understanding of author-
ity and seeks to establish DJSI and FTSE4Good as leading experts in the field
of ESG evaluation. Clearly, over the past decade the teams behind DJSI and
FTSE4Good (which include SAM, and until 2013, Eiris) have developed
unique expertise in ESG assessment. However, this kind of epistemological
justification is usually not considered sufficient to justify the use of regulatory
powers.
210. I draw in that context on the findings of a study I published in 2011,
which explored the institutional structures of FTSE4Good and DJSI. In that
study I highlighted significant differences between the two indexes. Whereas
FTSE4Good had established a relatively robust system of public consultation
and representation in its decision-making processes, DJSI seemed to draw
exclusively on the epistemic authority of SAM, one of the leading global sus-
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Consider first the institutional structure of FTSE4Good. At
the end of 2013, FTSE revised the management structure of the
indexes, ending its twelve year relationship with Eiris and opt-
ing to conduct all ESG evaluation in-house.211 The new institu-
tional structure of FTSE4Good is set out in four documents:
Index Inclusion Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Series - Version
1.6 June 2015,212 Ground Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Se-
ries - Version 2.3 October 2015,213 FTSE Russell ESG Advisory
Committee: Terms of Reference - December 2015,214 and Appeals
Against Decisions - Version 1.5 October 2015.215 The new re-
gime reflects a significant watering down of FTSE commitment
to democratic values both by strengthening FTSE control over
the regimes governing bodies and by avoiding making formal
commitments for public participation.216
The new regime provides an important role for an inde-
pendent committeethe FTSE ESG Advisory Committee,
which is given oversight authority over the FTSE ESG Rat-
ings.217
tainability investment groups, and provided few opportunities for public con-
sultation. Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 57378.
211. FTSE4Good Ends 12-year Relationship with Eiris, supra note 142.
212. FTSE4GOOD INDEX INCLUSION RULES, supra note 143.
213. FTSE4GOOD GROUND RULES, supra note 34.
214. FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL ESG ADVISORY COMMITTEE: TERMS
OF REFERENCE (2015) [hereinafter FTSE ESG ADVISORY COMMITTEE],
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160113172251/http://www.ftse.com/products/do
wnloads/FTSE_Russell_ESG_Advisory_Committee.pdf].
215. FTSE RUSSELL, APPEALS AGAINST DECISIONS (version 1.5, Oct. 2015)
[hereinafter FTSE APPEALS AGAINST DECISIONS],
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151020053355/http://www.ftse.com/products/do
wnloads/Appeals_Against_Decisions.pdf].
216. I also found no indication or records on the FTSE4Good website that
the transition into the new regime was accompanied a public consultation
process.
217. FTSE4GOOD INDEX INCLUSION RULES, supra note 143, § 2.3 (The
FTSE ESG Ratings also fall under the oversight of an independent committee
comprising experts from the investment community, companies, NGOs, unions
and academia. They meet regularly to oversee ESG Rating reviews and
methodology development.); The functions of that Committee are set out in
two documents: Ground Rules for the FTSE4Good Index Series and ESG Advi-
sory Committee: Terms of Reference. FTSE4GOOD GROUND RULES, supra note
34, §§ 2.1, 2.2, 6.4, 6.5, 7.2 (To assist in the oversight of the FTSE4Good
Index Series FTSE has established the FTSE ESG Advisory Committee . . . .
The membership of the Committee includes independent investment
professionals experienced in environmental, social and governance factors.
The Committee is responsible for advising on the content and management of
the FTSE4Good Index Inclusion Rules and may also recommend changes to
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The responsibilities of the Committee are to:
 Provide guidance on the development of the criteria and the
construction of the FTSE ESG ratings and ESG indexes in-
cluding the FTSE4Good Index Series;
 Comment on the index reviews for the FTSE4Good Index
Series;
 Periodically review the Ground Rules and Inclusion Criteria
for the FTSE4Good Index Series at the frequency set out in
those rules;
 Oversee the sub-groups that FTSE Russell may constitute to
provide more detailed feedback on specific components of
the methodology;
 Discuss proposed changes, as appropriate, to the Ground
Rules and Inclusion Criteria for the FTSE4Good Index Se-
ries and make recommendations for changes for subsequent
approval by the FTSE Russell Governance Board.218
The Committee consists of senior market practitioners
who are representative of appropriate sectors of the investment
community, together with other stakeholder representatives
with specific ESG expertise.219 But FTSE retains sole authori-
ty to decide whom to appoint to the committee.220 There is not
even a process for members of the public to offer their candida-
cy.221
The current regime differs from the previous one in several
key aspects. First, what was then called the Policy Committee
under the previous regime had the ultimate authority to ap-
prove changes to the constituents of the FTSE4Good universe
(that is, any additions to and deletions from the indexes).222
Under the current regime, the process of deletion or addition
has become semi-automatic, determined by the relevant eligi-
bility algorithm, and its de facto implementation is in the
those Rules.); FTSE ESG ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 214, § 2 (The
purpose of the Committee is to provide . . . the underlying methodologies of the
FTSE ESG ratings and associated index products . . . .).
218. See FTSE ESG ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 214, § 3.1.
219. Id. § 1.1.
220. See id. § 4 (Appointment to the Committee is by invitation and ex-
tended on a personal level to individual market practitioners and other stake-
holder representatives.).
221. See id.
222. See SUSTAINABILITY, RATE THE RATERS PHASE FIVE QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR READERS: FTSE4GOOD INDEX SERIES 4 (2013),
http://www.sustainability.com/library/attachment/428 ([A]n independent poli-
cy committee makes decisions regarding additions and deletion to the index,
and regarding new criteria development.).
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hands of the FTSE team.223 Second, appeals against inclusion
or deletion decisions are now decided by a new body called the
FTSE Jury of Appeal, whose composition differs from that of
the Advisory Committee.224
A further problem with the current regime is that it does
not offer a detailed commitment to public consultation in the
criteria development process. Under the previous regime, the
process consisted of five stages that were overseen by the
FTSE4Good Criteria Development Subcommittee:
1. Experts identified issues;
2. Focus groups found or tested potential criteria that could be used,
and to find areas of consensus that different stakeholders (e.g., inves-
tors, NGOs, and companies) could all support;
3. Market consultation was conducted on proposed criteria options;
4. The results of the consultation and recommendations were passed
on to the FTSE4Good Policy Committee, which made the final deci-
sions and approved the final criteria;
5. The criteria were implemented in stages.225
The detailed commitment to public consultation has been
abandoned in the current regime.226 One can find references to
this vision in non-binding statements, but this does not seem
satisfying.227
223. See FTSE4GOOD INDEX INCLUSION RULES, supra note 143, § 3.4 (If a
constituent of the Index still scores below 2.5 following a 12 month period they
will be deleted unless the FTSE ESG Advisory Committee approves a longer
period to apply.).
224. FTSE APPEALS AGAINST DECISIONS, supra note 215, § 3 (The FTSE
Russell Jury of Appeal will consist of past or present market practitioners of
the most experienced level who are representative of all appropriate sectors of
the investment community and who are independent from FTSE Russell at
the time of the appeal hearing at which they are present.). The identity of the
members of the Jury was not disclosed on the FTSE website as of fall 2015.
225. FTSE, CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT AND COMPANY ENGAGEMENT PRO-
GRAMME: 20032004 REPORT 3 (2004), [https://web.archive.org/web
/20130414100044/http://ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads
/FTSE4Good_Company_Engagement_Report.pdf]; FTSE, IMPACT OF NEW CRI-
TERIA & FUTURE DIRECTION: 20042005 REPORT 8 (2005),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20130414031703/http://ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Go
od_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_New_Criteria_&_Future_Impact_rep
ort.pdf].
226. For a detailed description of the previous management structure see
Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 57378.
227. FTSE4Good Index Series Factsheet, supra note 183 (Criteria are de-
veloped using an extensive market consultation process and are approved by
an independent committee of experts. A broad range of stakeholders help
shape the criteria, including NGOs, governmental bodies, consultants, aca-
demics, the investment community and the corporate sector.).
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How transparent is the current regime? One noticeable
change is that [t]he criteria are based only on publicly availa-
ble data, and in assessing ESG practice FTSE does not accept
data or information privately provided by companies. This im-
proves the credibility of data and enhances transparency across
the market.228 But except for this improvement over the previ-
ous regime, civic observers will find it difficult to understand
how FTSE4Good selects its companies and to understand the
institutional architecture of the scheme. For example, the
membership of the two most important bodies, the Advisory
Committee and the FTSE Jury, is not disclosed.229
The DJSI regime reflects an even less enthusiastic ap-
proach to the ideal of civic participation, coupled with an over-
all lack of transparency.230 DJSI has eliminated some mecha-
nisms for civic input that were in place four years ago.
Currently, under the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices Meth-
odology - October 2015, the indexes are governed by the DJSI
Index Committee, which consists of an equal number of repre-
sentatives of S&P Dow Jones Indices and of RobecoSAM,231
currently two representatives of each.232 The Committee has
two primary responsibilities. First, it is responsible
228. FTSE4GOOD INDEX INCLUSION RULES, supra note 143, § 2.3.
229. It is possible that the lack of transparency regarding the composition
of committees is temporary, and that it is associated with the governance
changes and the cessation of relations with Eiris. Under the old regime, a list
of committee members was listed on the FTSE website. See SUSTAINABILITY,
supra note 222, at 45 (The list of all committee members and their affilia-
tions are available publicly on the FTSE4Good website . . . . The committees
are comprised of independent members . . . to ensure impartiality in decision
making regarding company inclusion. Approximately half the members are
from the investment community and the other half represent a range of exper-
tise drawing from NGO, corporate and union backgrounds. Committee mem-
bers are chosen carefully to avoid any potential conflict of interest.); see, e.g.,
FTSE, FTSE4GOOD POLICY COMMITTEE MEMBERS,
[https://web.archive.org/web/20131021174347/http://www.ftse.com
/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/CommitteeMembers.pdf].
230. See Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 576 (DJSI, has
taken a more opaque and less open approach.).
231. DJSI METHODOLOGY, supra note 143, at 20 (The indices are governed
by the DJSI Index Committee consisting of an equal number of S&P Dow
Jones Indices and RobecoSAM representatives.).
232. As of December 2015, the DJSI Index Committee members were Da-
vid Blitzer, Managing Director, S&P Dow Jones Indices; Christopher Green-
wald, Head of SI Research, RobecoSAM AG; Manjit Jus, Head of Sustainabil-
ity Application & Operations, RobecoSAM AG; Christopher Pretlove, Associate
Director, Index Management, S&P Dow Jones Indices. Corporate Sustainabil-
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for overseeing the management of all changes affecting the DJSI In-
dices that are related to the Total Sustainability Scores . . . including
any additions or deletions of companies . . . arising from (i) a change
in the Total Sustainability Score of an existing index constituent; or
(ii) either a change in, or a newly created, Total Sustainability Score
of a company that, at the time of the decision, is not a constituent of
any DJSI index.233
Second, it is responsible for monitoring overall policy
guidelines and index methodologies, as well as additions to and
deletions from these indices and treatment of corporate ac-
tions.234 The Committee decides on all matters relating to
methodology, maintenance, constituent selection in accordance
with the index rules and index procedures.235
Until the end of 2011, the DJSI was governed by two com-
mittees.236 The DJSI World Index Design Committee had simi-
lar authority to that of the current DJSI Index Committee.237
But the DJSI framework included an additional committee, the
DJSI Advisory Committee, which was open to external stake-
holders and was composed of independent, third party profes-
sionals from the financial sector and corporate sustainability
ity Assessment, ROBECOSAM,
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151208125620/http://www.sustainability-
indices.com/sustainability-assessment/corporate-sustainability-
assessment.jsp] (last visited Dec. 8, 2015). In this respect DJSI is more trans-
parent than FTSE4Good.
233. DJSI METHODOLOGY, supra note 143, at 20.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Compare DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES, DOW JONES
SUSTAINABILITY WORLD INDEXES GUIDE 43 (version 10.1, Sept. 2008)
[hereinafter DJSI WORLD INDEX GUIDE 2008],
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151121221419/http://www.ideaspaz.org/tools/do
wnload/47354] (describing the roles of the DJSI World Index Design
Committee and the DJSI Advisory Committee in index management), and
DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES, DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY WORLD
INDEX GUIDE BOOK 40 (version 11.5, Jan. 2011) [hereinafter DJSI WORLD
INDEX GUIDE 2011] (on file with author and the Minnesota Journal of Law,
Science & Technology) (describing the roles of the DJSI Index Design
Committee and the SAM Faculty in index management), with ROBECOSAM,
DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY WORLD INDEX GUIDE 36 (version 12.1, Apr.
2013), [https://web.archive.org/web/20130503040827
/http://www.sustainability-indices.com/images/djsi-world-guidebook_tcm1071-
337244.pdf] (describing only the role of the DJSI Index Design Committee in
index management).
237. Compare DJSI WORLD INDEX GUIDE 2008, supra note 236, at 43, with
DJSI METHODOLOGY, supra note 143.
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performance experts.238 Its powers and functions were limited,
however, to provide insights into the field of sustainability and
investing, give advice on possible implications for sustainabil-
ity-driven portfolio management and offer input regarding the
methodology, marketing as well as product development for the
Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes.239 By the end of 2010, the
DJSI Advisory Committee was replaced by a different body,
called SAM Faculty, a move driven by an attempt to create a
broad pool of knowledge based on people representing different
voices.240 The Faculty was supposed to consist of five to ten
members (one of whom was a Dow Jones employee or designee)
who could provide a broad range of perspectives on sustainabil-
ity topics.241 SAM Faculty was incorporated into versions of the
DJSI Guide Book published in November 2010 and January
2011.242 But this idea was quickly abandoned for reasons I
could not verify based on public knowledge.243 The current
structure of DJSI index management provides no formal paths
for civic participation, whether directly or through representa-
tives.244 In this respect, FTSE4Good offers a more inclusive vi-
sion because the FTSE ESG Advisory Committee does includes
external stakeholders with ESG expertise.
Overall, despite their public influence, neither FTSE4Good
nor DJSI provide sufficient opportunities for public involve-
ment or allow meaningful public monitoring.
V. GREENING THE FTSE4GOOD AND DJSI: A MORE
SUSTAINABLE VISION OF SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES
To become real champions of green economy, FTSE4Good
and DJSI must respond to the two challenges: the intermixing
238. DJSI WORLD INDEX GUIDE 2008, supra note 236, at 43.
239. Id.
240. DJSI WORLD INDEX GUIDE 2011, supra note 236, at 40.
241. Id.
242. Id.; Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 477.
243. I found a single mention of SAM Faculty in the SAM Sustainable As-
set Management AG response to the PRI Reporting and Assessment Survey
2011 (response to Q. 57). SUSTAINABLE ASSET MGMT., PRI REPORTING AND
ASSESSMENT SURVEY 20 (2011),
http://unpri.org/report11/2011_responses/PRI%202011%20-%20Full%20Resp
onses%20for%20publication%20-%20SAM%20Sustainable%20Asset%20Man
agement%20AG%20(0017000000N7czw).pdf.
244. See Perez, Ensemble Regulation, supra note 45, at 576 (DJSI relies
primarily on its inhouse expertise and internal knowledge.).
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of continuous financial monitoring with ordinal sustainability
ranking and democratic deficits. Below I suggest ways in which
these goals can be achieved.
A. THE INTERMIXING CHALLENGE: DEVELOPING NEW
SUSTAINABILITY METRICS
Consider first the problem created by the way in which
these indexes intermix ordinal sustainability ranking and
quantitative measurement of financial performance. This in-
termingled framework creates a problematic result where sus-
tainability-oriented firms are judged, even within the frame-
work of sustainability indexes, primarily by their financial
rather than sustainability scores. To rectify this flaw, the in-
dexes must develop new metrics that provide quantitative
measures of the sustainability performance of listed firms and
of the index as a whole, and of the manner in which this per-
formance changes over time. There are two key options in
which such measurement may be implemented:
(1) Developing objective sustainability indicators that can
be used to measure sustainability performance of firms,
covering various dimensions of sustainability;
(2) Tracking changes in the overall sustainability scores of
the firms based on the indexes internal scoring systems.
The first option is based on developing indicators that re-
flect important facets of firms sustainability strategy.245 This
option reflects a pluralistic understanding of sustainability,
which makes it, I argue, more in line with contemporary think-
ing about sustainability. A value-pluralistic understanding of
sustainability calls for using multiple languages of valuation
(which cannot be translated into a single super-scale) in the
consideration of firms behavior.246 Value pluralism is the idea
245. This approach assumes that it is not possible to capture sustainability
performance using a single indicator (comparable to money). See STIGLITZ ET
AL., supra note 129, at 73 (rejecting the idea that sustainability can be cap-
tured in one number).
246. See Boeraeve Fanny et al., How (Not) to Perform Ecosystem Service
Valuations: Pricing Gorillas in the Mist, 24 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION
187, 189 (2015) ([C]onsideration of multiple languages of valuation can be
critical to address the wider societal value of ES. (citations omitted)); see also
ERIK GOMEZ-BAGGETHUN ET AL., STATE-OF-THE-ART REPORT ON INTEGRATED
VALUATION OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 67 (2014), http://www.openness-
project.eu/sites/default/files/Deliverable%204%201_Integrated-Valuation-Of-
Ecosystem-Services.pdf.
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that there are multiple values which in principle may be equal-
ly correct and could in various contexts conflict with each
other.247 Contrary to value monism, value pluralism would
argue that these multiple values are not reducible to a single
value and their potential conflicts are not governed by some
single meta criteria.248
This pluralistic understanding of sustainability has gained
wide support over the past decade. The Intergovernmental
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has
recently published a conceptual framework for the valuation of
nature that considers a whole range of values from monetary to
spiritual and from instrumental to relational.249 A similar plu-
ralistic vision can also be found in the influential 2009 report of
the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance
and Social Performance. After a detailed discussion of various
alternatives to GDP, the Commission concluded that measur-
ing sustainability requires multiple measures that include both
monetary indexes of sustainability and a well-chosen set of
physical indicators.250 In the words of the Commission, the
dashboard we use to assess the performance of the economy
(in our context, the firm) should include multiple indicators.251
The Commission noted that in order to measure sustainability,
we need,
indicators that tell us the sign of the change in the quantities of the
different factors that matter for future well-being. Putting the sus-
tainability issue in these terms compels recognition that sustainabil-
ity requires the simultaneous preservation or increase in several
stocks: quantities and qualities not only of natural resources but also
of human, social and physical capital. Any approach that focuses on
247. GOMEZ-BAGGETHUN ET AL., supra note 246, at 7.
248. Id.; STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 129, at 12 (Such a system must, of
necessity, be plural  because no single measure can summarize something as
complex as the well-being of the members of society, our system of measure-
ment must encompass a range of different measures.).
249. See Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Ser-
vices [IPBES], Dec. IPBES-2/4, annex, Conceptual Framework for the Inter-
governmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services,
¶¶ 6, 8, 9 (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.ipbes.net/images/decisions
/Decision%20IPBES_2_4.pdf (Nature contributes to societies through the
provision of benefits to people (instrumental and relational values . . . ) and
has its own intrinsic values, that is, the value inherent to nature, independent
of human experience and evaluation and thus beyond the scope of anthropo-
centric valuation approaches.).
250. STIGLITZ ET AL., supra note 129, at 79.
251. Id. at 17, 6264.
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only a part of these items does not offer a comprehensive view of sus-
tainability. 252
What is needed therefore is, a set of well-chosen physical
indicators, which would focus on dimensions of environmental
sustainability that are either already important or could be-
come so in the future, and that remain difficult to capture in
monetary terms.253
The approach of the Commission provides a good guideline
for a possible revision of the measurement strategy used by the
indexes. To facilitate a more sustainability-oriented evaluation
of firms behavior, sustainability indexes should develop objec-
tive measures that cover key aspects, both environmental and
social, of corporations sustainability profiles. These measures
should be reported alongside the conventional indicators that
track changes in firms share values. Two examples of such po-
tential indicators can illustrate this idea.
The first example focuses on a possible environmental
measure: an indicator that tracks carbon emissions. This indi-
cator can serve as a good proxy of the firms commitment to the
environment.254 The issue of climate change is already heavily
emphasized in the inclusion criteria of both FTSE4Good and
DJSI.255 The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) illustrates how
such an indicator can work. CDP seeks to transform the way
the world does business to prevent dangerous climate change
and protect our natural resources.256 CDP holds the largest
collection globally of self reported climate change, water and
forest-risk data.257 One of their products, the A List: The CDP
252. Id. at 7778.
253. Id. at 79.
254. See U.N. DEPT OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, INDICATORS OF SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT: GUIDELINES AND METHODOLOGIES, at 12, 60, U.N. Sales
No. E.08.II.A.2 (2007), http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo
/indicators/guidelines.pdf (listing carbon emissions as one of the core indica-
tors of sustainable development).
255. See ROBECOSAM, CSA METHODOLOGY, supra note 55, at 9, fig. 4 (list-
ing climate change governance and climate strategy as two out of twelve envi-
ronmental parameters that also include, among others, bio-diversity, envi-
ronmental reporting, and water-related risks); FTSE Group Introduces New
Climate Change Criteria to its FTSE4Good Series, supra note 155; FTSE All-
World ex Fossil Fuels Index Series, FTSE,
http://www.ftse.com/products/indices/ex-fossil-fuels (last visited Nov. 20, 2015)
(providing All-World and North America indexes negativly screened for com-
panies heavily invested in fossil fuels and coal).
256. Catalyzing Business and Government Action, supra note 53.
257. Id.
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Climate Performance Leadership Index, lists companies around
the world that are doing the most to combat climate change
(CPLI Firms).258 In 2014, the list included 187 firms out of
1,971 firms that have responded to CDPs call to provide cli-
mate change data.259 CPLI firms differ from their less commit-
ted peers by investing more in activities to reduce emissions, by
being more effective in reducing their emissions, and by mak-
ing signi!cantly better progress with their targets for absolute
emission reductions.260 The activities of CLPI firms yield annu-
al emissions reductions of nine percent on average per compa-
ny, while their non-listed peers achieved only six percent.261
The A List has collectively reduced its absolute emissions by
33 million metric tons in 2013, with total emissions standing
at 693.7 million metric tons.262 Figure 1, based on data provid-
ed to the author by CDP, describes changes in the total carbon
emissions of CPLI firms.263 The figure shows a decrease in total
emissions over this period (after some increase in 2013).
258. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, THE A LIST: THE CDP CLIMATE PER-
FORMANCE LEADERSHIP INDEX 2014, at 68 (2014),
https://www.cdp.net/CDPResults/CDP-climate-performance-leadership-index-
2014.pdf.
259. Id. at 8.
260. Id. at 9.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. I would like to thank CDP, in particular Emma Whelan, for providing
me these data. The data are also available on the CDP website, although not
in the aggregated format provided here. See Corporate Climate Leaders Re-
vealed, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/events/2014/cdp-leaders.aspx
(last visited Nov. 20, 2014). The charts report aggregate and average carbon
emissions of CPLI firms between 2012 and 2014. The emission data include
both Scope 1 (S1) emissions, all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions directly
from sources that are owned or controlled by the reporting entity, and Scope 2
(S2) emissions, all indirect greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the con-
sumption of purchased electricity, heat, or steam. Indirect GHG emissions are
a consequence of the activities of the reporting entity, but occur at sources
owned or controlled by another entity. For this distinction, see, CDP, CLI-
MATE ACTION AND PROFITABILITY: CDP S&P 500 CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT
2014, at 43 (2014), https://www.cdp.net/CDPResults/CDP-SP500-leaders-
report-2014.pdf. The data for 2014 (and respectively for previous years) reflect
data collected in the CDP 2014 cycle. Exact dates for each company vary. For
the majority of firms, the 2014 data reflect emissions from January 1, 2013 to
December 31, 2013. Some companies may report May 1, 2013 to April 30,
2014. The charts include only reports that contained full information for 2012
to 2014 (eight firms were omitted because of partial information).
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Figure 1. CPLI total carbon emissions per year264
I argue that FTSE4Good and DJSI should develop a simi-
lar carbon emissions index that tracks the carbon emissions of
listed firms in each of their various indexes (on an annual ba-
sis). Such an index would provide an important yardstick for
evaluating the environmental performance of listed firms and
of the index as a whole, which in turn could be compared with
the financial performance of the firms and of the index.265
FTSE4Good and DJSI cannot rely exclusively on carbon emis-
sions because such index would capture only one aspect of the
firms sustainability efforts. It is necessary to develop addition-
al indicators that could measure other dimensions of firms sus-
264. See Corporate Climate Leaders Revealed, supra note 263.
265. For an attempt to develop indicators to measure the level of efforts on
sustainable use of water by companies, see ManMohan S. Sodhi & Ekaterina
Yatskovskaya, Developing a Sustainability Index for Companies Efforts on
Responsible Use of Water, 63 INTL J. PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCEMGMT. 800
(2014).
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tainability performance. For example, an index that tracks the
gender diversity of listed firms corporate boards may be used
as a proxy for their sensitivity to gender equality. The issue of
board gender diversity has attracted growing research interest
in recent years, reflecting a more general concern over under-
representation of women and female perspectives in corporate
decision making and firms attention to work-life balance and
families.266 Such an index could be designed by calculating the
percentage of board seats occupied by women at listed firms
and how this percentage changes over time. The National Asso-
ciation for Female Executives (NAFE) publishes a report listing
the NAFE Top 50 Companies for Executive Women, which in-
cludes such an indicator.267 At the NAFE Top 50, the percent-
age of female board members has increased from 23% in 2010,
to 27% in 2014, while women comprised only 17% of boards of
directors across the Fortune 500 companies in 2014.268
Naturally, a prerequisite for developing such sustainabil-
ity-tracking measures is that the necessary data would be ac-
cessible. The above examples are based on data that satisfy
this condition. As noted above, climate change is already part
of DJSI and FTSE4Good inclusion criteria, and the case of CDP
proves that firms are willing to share data regarding their car-
266. See, e.g., Richard A. Bernardi et al., Does Female Representation on
Boards of Directors Associate with the Most Ethical Companies List?, 12
CORP. REPUTATION REV. 270 (2009); Kate Grosser & Jeremy Moon, Gender
Mainstreaming and Corporate Social Responsibility: Reporting Workplace
Issues, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 327 (2005); Susan Adams, The 10 Best Companies
for Women in 2014, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2014, 10:10 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/02/05/the-10-best-companies-
for-women-in-2014/; NATL ASSN FOR FEMALE EXECUTIVES, TOP COMPANIES
FOR EXECUTIVE WOMEN 2014 (2014), http://www.wmmsurveys.com
/NAFE_ExecutiveSummary_2014.pdf; YALE LAW WOMEN, TOP TEN FAMILY
FRIENDLY FIRMS LIST, http://ylw.commons.yale.edu/top-ten-list/ (last visited
Nov. 20, 2015) (ranking law firms according to important family friendliness
indicators such as billable hour requirements, part-time and flex-time options,
parental leave polices, and childcare availability). There is also a significant
group of studies that examine the linkage between corporate board gender
diversity and stock performance. See, e.g., Kevin Campbell & Antonio
Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Per-
formance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 435 (2008); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corpo-
rate Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or
Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 809 (2010).
267. NATL ASSN FOR FEMALE EXECUTIVES, supra note 266, at 7 (showing
changes in women representation on boards of the NAFE Top 50 companies
from 2010 to 2014).
268. Id. at 78.
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bon emissions.269 Board membership data is easily accessible
and verifiable, but carbon emissions data may not be. A poten-
tial obstacle, however, is the cost of producing these additional
sustainability measures. FTSE4Good and DJSI may argue that
they do not have the means to develop and produce these in-
dexes. There is a simple response to such an argument: link up
with third parties that can undertake the task.270 Further, be-
cause the development of these additional measures serves a
public goal there is strong justification for providing some pub-
lic subsidy for them.
A second way in which FTSE4Good and DJSI could track
the sustainability performance of listed firms is by drawing up-
on their internal scoring frameworks. Consider, for example,
the new FTSE4Good scoring system. According to this system,
[e]ach company in the research universe is given a FTSE ESG
Rating ranging from 0 to 5.271 Companies with an FTSE ESG
Rating of 3.3 and above are added to the index.272 Constituents
of the FTSE4Good Index with an ESG Rating below 2.5 are at
risk of deletion from the FTSE4Good Index.273 FTSE can pro-
duce a parallel index that would track changes in the average
scores of the firms that pass the eligibility threshold.274 This
could give a good indication of the average sustainability per-
formance of listed firms.
There are several difficulties with this approach, which
make it less attractive from a policy perspective. First, this op-
tion uses the indexes internal scoring system as a kind of su-
per-scale, which can incorporate all the divergent information
on the firms sustainability performance. This view is incon-
sistent with a value-pluralistic understanding of sustainability.
Second, because this approach is based on the indexes internal
scoring system, it is highly opaque. External observers will not
receive information about the firms actual sustainability per-
269. See supra notes 25563 and accompanying text.
270. For example, the Carbon Disclosure Project.
271. FTSE4GOOD INDEX INCLUSION RULES, supra note 143, § 3.2.
272. Id.
273. Id. § 3.4. If a constituent of the Index scores below 2.5 following a 12
month period, it is deleted unless the FTSE4Good Committee approves an
extension. Id.
274. A similar index can be produced based on the DJSI scoring system,
concerning data obtained from the constituent firms of various DJSI indexes.
For the DJSI scoring system, see ROBECOSAM, CSA METHODOLOGY, supra
note 55, at 56.
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formance in various domains. A final difficulty with this ap-
proach is that if the scoring criteria are frequently changed, it
will be hard to get a good picture of changes in firms sustaina-
bility performance drawing solely on the indexes internal scor-
ing system.
Developing a more complex dashboard that would present
quantified sustainability indicators alongside data on share
performance is critical for enabling a public debate about the
difficult trade-offs underlying a shift into a more sustainable
economy. The potential trade-offs between profits and envi-
ronmental quality, or between profits and potential improve-
ments to the lives of people with disabilities can only be appre-
ciated if we establish a more symmetrical informational
setting. Creating a more balanced informational setting does
not solve, however, the decision-making challenge created by
conflicts between intrinsic values (the incommensurability di-
lemma).275 The framework I propose explicitly rejects the idea
that such conflicts can be resolved through some meta criteria
or super-scale. Further, if society continues to discount the non-
financial achievements of firms because it does not recognize
the alternative values underlying these achievements, disclos-
ing this data in quantified form would not change much. None-
theless, enabling an informationally balanced debate about
these trade-offs is a necessary step in a potential shift to a
green economy regime.276
Another implication of this argument is a deeper commit-
ment to transparency, at least with respect to the raw data on
275. Elinor Mason, Value Pluralism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 29,
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/ (stating incommen-
surability occurs when there is no common measure which can be used to
compare two different values).
276. A dominant philosophical approach, going back to Aristotle, to resolv-
ing conflicts between intrinsic values is practical wisdom. Practical wisdom
solves problems of incommensurability without reasoning from general princi-
ples, but rather with a faculty of judgment. See id. In a short piece from 1994,
Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams note in this context that there is no me-
chanical procedure for deciding which conflict between values could be re-
solved by appeal to general priority rules and which should be left to judg-
ments of importance. In general, they argue practical decision could not in
principle be made completely algorithmic, and that a conception of practical
reason which aims at an algorithmic ideal must be mistaken. Isaiah Berlin &
Bernard Williams, Pluralism and Liberalism: A Reply, 42 POLY STUD. 306,
307 (1994).
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which the sustainability indicators are based.277 A good exam-
ple of such an approach is again CDP, which provides free ac-
cess to all the individual responses provided by the companies,
including details on greenhouse gas emissions and water man-
agement.278 In contrast, neither DJSI nor FTSE4Good provide
free access to their databases. For example, DJSI, which simi-
larly draws on the firms responses to their specially designed
questionnaires, does not provide access to the responses.279
B. THE DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: CREATINGMORE
PARTICIPATORY INDEXES
The second challenge that FTSE4Good and DJSI must deal
with concerns their democratic deficit. Both FTSE4Good and
DJSI insist that their schemes have significant steering power
and that they can positively influence the sustainability per-
formance of companies through their inclusion criteria and
their engagement programs.280 They are therefore subject to
stricter legitimacy claims. It seems, however, that whereas
both institutions are happy to embrace the steering aspect of
the equation, they refuse to accept its democratic aspect. In the
past four years, there has been no attempt by either organiza-
tion to develop new models that would grant civic society
agents a meaningful voice in their governance structure.281 In-
deed, some of the mechanisms that were in place a few years
277. For a similar approach to transparency, see Principles, GLOBAL INITI-
ATIVE FOR SUSTAINABILITY RATINGS, http://ratesustainability.org
/standards/principles/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
278. See Search Company & City Responses, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en-
US/Results/Pages/responses.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2015). Free access is
granted to the raw data through the search agent on the CDP portal. Access to
the full database, for more sophisticated statistical analysis, is restricted and
requires some fees. This model seems to strike a reasonable balance between
the need to provide transparency and the need to protect CDPs property
rights on the data.
279. DJSI provides access only to a sample questionnaire. Questionnaire 1,
ROBECOSAM, http://www.robecosam.com/images/sample-questionnaire-1.pdf
(last visited Oct. 12, 2015); RobecoSAM Corporate Sustainability Assessment,
ROBECOSAM, http://www.robecosam.com/en/sustainability-insights/about-
sustainability/robecosam-corporate-sustainability-assessment.jsp.
280. See FTSE, supra note 164, at 9 (FTSE4Good has made a significant
and measurable impact on the behavior of companies worldwide.); SAM &
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 171, at 22 ([O]ur ongoing efforts has
been tremendous in terms of improving the sustainability performance of
large corporations across the world.).
281. See supra notes 21044 and accompanying text.
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ago have been phased out. There is also a significant lack of
transparency in the way both DJSI and FTSE4Good operate.
Admittedly, when considering the models of civic participation
and more extensive disclosure practices, we should take into
account the specific features of both schemes and the need to
protect the commercial interests of the index owners and of the
listed firms alike. However, it is clear that more can be done,
even if we consider these constraints. There are various ways
in which DJSI and FTSE4Good could provide more significant
participation opportunities to civic society players, either by
designing more inclusive advisory bodies or by committing to
periodic consultation processes.282 Indeed, global environmen-
tal organizations, such as the GRI, Social Accountability Inter-
national, and the newly established Equator Principles Associ-
ation, have developed progressive consultation and deliberative
schemes as well as far-reaching transparency mechanisms.283
FTSE and DJSI can follow those examples in developing struc-
tures that fit their unique needs.
A good example of a sustainability index based on a more
inclusive governance structure can be found in the Israeli
Maala CSR index.284 Maala is the leading CSR organization in
Israel.285 It is an umbrella organization comprising some 130 of
the largest companies in the country.286 Since its establishment
in 1998, its goal has been to promote CSR in Israel. Maala is
282. My recommendations are consistent with the Global Initiative for
Sustainability Ratings (GISR) new Sustainability Ratings Standard which
calls for greater inclusiveness in the design and implementation of sustaina-
bility rankings. Principles, supra note 277.
283. See GRIs Governance Bodies, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/network/network-structure/governance-
bodies/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2015); SA8000:2014 Revision
Process, SOC. ACCT. INTL, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&pageId=1546 (last visited Oct.
12, 2015); The Equator Principles Working Groups, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES,
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles/52-
best-practice-resources-and-links/35 (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). Further ex-
amples are discussed in Oren Perez, Open Government, Technological Innova-
tion and the Politics of Democratic Disillusionment: (E-)Democracy from Soc-
rates to Obama, 9 I/S: J. L. & POLY INFO. SOCY 61 passim (2013).
284. See CSR Index 2015, supra note 31.
285. See id. I also held a background discussion with Momo Mahadav,
President of Maala, the Israeli CSR Index, on October 6, 2014.
286. About us, MAALA, http://www.maala.org.il/en
/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA-
%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9C%D7%94/ (last visited, Oct. 12, 2015).
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part of a global network of organizations that promote corpo-
rate responsibility, including BSR, CSR 360, and the U.N.
Global Compact.287 Since 2003, Maala has produced the annu-
al Maala Index, which ranks both publicly traded and privately
held Israeli companies based on CSR criteria.288 Companies are
evaluated based on their performance in six principal areas:
environment, business ethics, human rights and work envi-
ronment, community involvement, corporate governance and
social and environmental reporting.289 The Tel-Aviv Maala
SRI index is published on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE)
and allows investors with ethical orientation to invest in it
through a tracking fund.290
Maala has established an elaborate process of public con-
sultation that is significantly more inclusive than the govern-
ance structures of both FTSE4Good and DJSI. First, the crite-
ria by which firms are evaluated must be approved by a public
advisory committee that includes thirty-one members.291 Elev-
en members come from the firms participating in the ranking
process, and the remaining twenty from diverse backgrounds,
including academia, non-government organizations, investment
firms, and TASE.292 In addition to this permanent body, Maala
has developed a structured consultation process for the revision
of the evaluation criteria, which takes place bi-annually.293 The
process consists of the following key steps:294
 A public discussion of the Maala CSR ranking;
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. About Maala Index, MAALA, http://www.maala.org.il/en/about-maala-
index/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
290. See Additional Indices, TEL-AVIV STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.tase.co.il/Eng/MarketData
/Indices/Additional/Pages/IndexMainDataAdditional.aspx (last visited Oct. 23,
2015).
291. I have been a member of the public committee almost since its estab-
lishment.
292. The Public Committee, MAALA, http://www.maala.org.il/en/the-public-
committee/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (giving the full list of committee mem-
bers).
293. Changes in the 2012 Questionnaire, MAALA,
http://www.maala.org.il/en/changes-in-the-2012-questionnaire/ (last visited
Oct. 23, 2015).
294. The reference here is to the first revision cycle, which took place in
20122013.
218 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 17:1
 Publication of a call for comments on the ranking
and the evaluation criteria (the full criteria are
available on the Maala website295);
 Meeting of all the sub-committees of the public ad-
visory committee to discuss the criteria and exam-
ine the public comments received;
 Publication of a draft of the revised criteria, to elicit
comments;
 Concluding discussion in the public advisory com-
mittee and final approval of the new criteria.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES  GREEN
ECONOMY OR GREENWASH?
The main challenge of green economy is not necessarily to
identify an optimal middle way between the demands of sus-
tainability and economic growth. Rather, it is to provide a
framework in which the difficult trade-offs that must be ad-
dressedif the global society adopts a genuine strategy of sus-
tainable growthcan be openly discussed and given an equal
normative standing. Achieving such informational symmetry
would be a first step in the path toward sustainable develop-
ment.
This general challenge has practical consequences for
FTSE4Good and DJSI. They need to decide whether they are
willing to challenge some of the traditional practices of the fi-
nancial system by experimenting with new ESG metrics and
novel models of participation. But given the systemic con-
straints imposed on sustainability indexes by the global eco-
nomic system, such radical steps would require regulatory
courage that is quite rare in the current political-economic en-
vironment.296
295. See 2014 Maala Index, MAALA, http://www.maala.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/new-qri-14151.pdf (last visited, Oct. 12, 2015).
296. See Oren Perez, Courage, Regulatory Responsibility, and the Chal-
lenge of Higher-Order Reflexivity, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 203, 205 (2014).
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APPENDIX
Table 2: Top 10 Constituents - FTSE4Good Environmen-
tal Leaders Europe 40 Index (October 30 2015)297
Constituent ICB Sector Country
Nestle Food Producers Switzerland
Novartis (REGD)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolo-
gy Switzerland
Roche Hldgs (GENUS)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolo-
gy Switzerland
HSBC Hldgs Banks UK
Sanofi
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolo-
gy France
Bayer AG Chemicals Germany
GlaxoSmithKline
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolo-
gy UK
Royal Dutch Shell A Oil & Gas Producers UK
Vodafone Group Mobile Telecommunications UK
AstraZeneca
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnolo-
gy UK
297. FTSE4Good Environmental Leaders Europe 40 Index Factsheet, supra
note 191.
